Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video Games: Three Responses to First Amendment Concerns by Saunders, Kevin W.
Michigan State University College of Law
Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law
Faculty Publications
1-1-2003
Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video Games:
Three Responses to First Amendment Concerns
Kevin W. Saunders
Michigan State University College of Law, saunde44@law.msu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.msu.edu/facpubs
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Michigan State University College of Law. For more
information, please contact domannbr@law.msu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kevin W. Saunders, Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video Games: Three Responses to First Amendment Concerns, 2003 L. Rev.
M.S.U.-D.C.L. 51 (2003).
HeinOnline -- 2003 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 51 2003
REGULATING YOUTH ACCESS TO VIOLENT VIDEO 
GAMES: THREE RESPONSES TO FIRST 
AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
Kevin W. Saunders' 
2003 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 51 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 52 
I. VIDEO GAMES AND REAL WORLD VIOLENCE - MEETING 
STRICT SCRUTINY ......................................... 61 
A. Research on the Effects of Violence in Other Media ........ 62 
B. Causation and Video Games ........................... 71 
C. The Training and Instructional Danger of Video Games ..... 76 
D. Meeting Strict Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 77 
II. VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY ................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 78 
A. The Ordinary Language Concept ....................... 80 
B. Legal History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 83 
C. Policy Bases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 85 
D. Children and Variable Obscenity ....................... 87 
E. Obscenity and Offence ............................... 88 
m. VIDEO GAMES AS UNPROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT ..... 93 
A. Early Video Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 93 
B. Modem Games ..................................... 98 
C. Improved Story Lines Not Enough ..................... 100 
D. Video Games as Non-communication ................... 101 
N. IMPLEMENTING THEORY ................................. 106 
A. First Amendment Values ............................. 106 
B. Drafting Statutes ................................... 108 
1. Statutes Based on Harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 109 
2. Statutes Based on Violence as Obscene. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 110 
3. Statutes Based on Video Games as Unprotected . . . . . . .. 113 
CONCLUSION ............................................. 113 
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University-Detroit College of Law. A.B., Franklin 
& Marshall College; M.S., M.A., Ph.D., University of Miami; J.D., University of Michigan. 
This effort was supported by a research grant from Michigan State University-Detroit College 
of Law. After submission of this paper, the Lion & Lamb project requested the author to write 
an Amicus Curiae Brieffor the pending Interactive Digital Software Ass 'n v. St. Louis County, 
No. 02-3010, appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 
HeinOnline -- 2003 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 52 2003
52 Law Review [Vol. 1:51 
INTRODUCTION 
American's concern over media violence, formerly directed toward 
television and film, I has recentered over the past several years on violence in 
video games. This refocusing followed on the heels of several school 
shootings in which video games were seen as playing a role. The most 
horrific of these events, and the one that really seemed to put the issue in the 
spotlight, was the 1999 Columbine High School killings in Colorado; but even 
before that massacre, there had been approximately two hundred American 
children killed in "school associated violence" between 1992 and 1998.2 
The details of the murderous spree of Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris at 
Columbine High can be found at a variety of sources. 3 The tie to video games 
is found in the fact that Harris and Klebold were said to play violent video 
games for hours and were fanatics with regard to the video game Doom.4 
Harris had even modified Doom on his computer to make him, as the player, 
1. As early as 1992, a Times Mirror poll found seventy-two percent of Americans 
expressing the sentiment that television is too violent. See Charles S. Clark & Mary H. Cooper, 
TV Violence, 3 CQRESEARCHER265, 268 (1993). This concem reflected the findings ofa 1986 
study by the American Psychological Association's task force on television and society that 
concluded that by the time the average child finishes elementary school, the child has viewed 
over eight thousand murders and over one hundred thousand other acts of violence, and 
depending on viewing habits, may have seen as many as two hundred thousand acts of violence, 
before becoming a teenager. See ALETHA C. HUSTON ET AL., BIG WORLD, SMALL SCREEN: THE 
ROLE OF TELEVISION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 53-54 (Gary B. Melton & Carolyn Stineman 
Schroeder eds., 1992). 
2. The calculation is that of Ronald Stephens, director of the National School Safety 
Center. See Understanding Violent Children: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Early 
Childhood. Youth and Families of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, I 05th Congo 
(1998) (testimony of Ron Stephens), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committeesiedul 
hedcew5-97.000Ihedcew5-97.htm#_Toc434653 165. 
3. See, e.g., Lynn Bartels & Ann Imse, Friendly Faces Hid Kid Killers: Social. 
Normal Teens Eventually Harbored Dark. Sinister Attitudes, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, 
Apr. 22, 1999, at lOA; Mark Obmascik, Healing Begins: Colorado, World Mourn Deaths at 
Columbine High, THE DENVER POST, Apr. 22, 1999, at I A; Norm Clarke, Luck and a Lie Saved 
Wrestler: Teen's Shamrock Cap His 'Lucky Charm • • DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 
22, 1999, at A 14; Mike Anton, Death Goes to School with Cold, Evil Laughter, DENVER ROCKY 
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 21, 1999, at 2A; Tina Griego et aI., Quiet Loners Worried Other 
Students: Trench Coat Mafia Spoke about Violence. Carried Reputation!or Being Outsiders, 
DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 21,1999, at 6A; Mark Eddy, Shooter Told Friend: 
"Get out of Here", THE DENVER POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at 17 A. 
4. See Burt Hubbard, Researchers Say Harris Reconfigured Video Game: Boy Turned 
'Doom' into School Massacre, Investigators Claim, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 
3,1999, at IA. 
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invincible and with unlimited weaponry and ammunition. The game became 
one in which "[t]he player simply mows down all the other characters."s His 
modification also had some of the dying victims asking God why they were 
shot,6 a scenario at least somewhat similar to a query Harris and Klebold put 
to some victims at Columbine as to whether or not they believed in God. A 
video tape also shows one of the killers calling his shotgun "Arlene," a 
favorite character in Doom.7 
Earlier school shootings showed similar connections to video games. In 
1997, in remote Bethel, Alaska, Evan Ramsey, a high school student, killed 
two and wounded two others.8 He, too, enjoyed violent video games, playing 
Doom, Die Hard, and Resident Evil for hours at a time.9 Ramsey, who had 
little real experience with fire arms, placed some blame on the games, saying 
they taught him that being shot does not cause death but a reduction in the 
player's "health factor."10 One of the strongest cases can be made in the 
shootings by Michael Carneal at Heath High School in the Paducah, Kentucky 
area. II Carneal came to school one morning with a .22 caliber semiautomatic 
pistol, two rifles, and two shotguns and began shooting at a prayer group 
whose meeting was just breaking Up.12 He killed three and wounded five. 13 
Carneal also enjoyed playing Doom, as well as other violent video games such 
as Quake and Redneck Rampage. 14 
5. Jd. 
6. See id. 
7. See Associated Press, 'Doom' Defendants: Dismiss Suit, THE DENVER POST, Aug. 
29,2001, at ~B. 
8. For a description of the Bethel shootings, see Tom Bell & Rosemary Shinohara, 
Student Kills 2 in Bethel: Frightened Teens Flee High School, ANCHORAGE DAlLVNEWS, Feb. 
20, 1997, at A-I. 
9. See Steve Fainaru, Experts Fear Video Games Breed Violence, ANCHORAGE DAIL V 
NEWS, Nov. 9, 1998, at A-I. 
10. See id. 
II . See Ted Bridis, Praying Students Slain, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Dec. 2, 1997, 
at AI. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. 
14. For assertions of the role of video games in the Heath High School killings see 
James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Ky. 2000), aff'd, 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 123 S. Ct. 967 (2003); DAVE GROSSMAN & GLORIA 
DEGAETANO, STOP TEACHING OUR KIDS TO KILL: A CALL TO ACTION AGAINST TV, MOVIE & 
VIDEO GAME VIOLENCE (1999); John Cheves, Do Violent Images Cause Violent Action? Heath 
Parents' Lawsuit Must Prove Direct Link, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, May 2, 1999, at A I; 
James Prichard, Suit Blames Hollywood, Net for Heath Shootings, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Apr. 13, I 999, at A I. 
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While many may be skeptical of the ability of violent media to make a 
good child go so bad, and indeed the killers in most of the school cases 
seemed troubled, there is an additional factor in the Paducah case that should 
give pause to even those most doubting as to psychological influences. 
According to his lawyer, Carneal had "no appreciable exposure to firearms."ls 
Yet, with eightI6 or nine17 shots, he had eight hits, all in the head or upper 
torso. Such accuracy with a handgun, especially for an inexperienced 
marksman, is astounding. "The FBI says that the average experienced law 
enforcement officer, in the average shootout, at an average range of seven 
yards, hits with approximately one bullet in five.,,18 How then did a fourteen-
year-old manage five head shots and three in the upper torso? 19 It appears to 
have been his video game training that made him an effective killer. 
[Carneal] never moved his feet during his rampage. He never fired far to the right or 
left, never far up or down. He simply fired once at everything that popped up on his 
"screen." It is not natural to fire once at each target. The normal, almost universal, 
response is to fire at a target until it drops and then move on to the next target. This 
is the defensive reaction that will save our lives, the human instinctual reaction-
eliminate the threat quickly. Not to shoot once and then go on to another target 
before the first threat has been eliminated. But most video games teach you to fire at 
each target only once, hitting as many targets as you can as fast as you can in order 
to rack up a high score. And many video games give bonus effects ... for head 
shots.2o 
One does not have to accept the notion that media violence causes actual 
violence to see a relationship here. Whatever may have caused Carneal to be 
motivated to kill, video games appear to have given him the skills and 
reactions to accomplish his goal. 
The next shooting in the series, this one in Jonesboro, Arkansas, also 
implicates video games. Mitchell Johnson, a thirteen-year-old, and Andrew 
Golden, an eleven-year-old, stole nine or ten guns from the Golden family, 
took at least four of them, two pistols and two hunting rifles, to their middle 
school and killed four girls and a teacher and wounded ten others.21 The boys 
took up a position at the edge of a wooded area next to the school. One of 
them set off a fire alarm and then returned to their vantage point. As the 
children filed out of the school in response to the alarm, they used high 
15. Cheves, supra note 14, at *3. 
16. See id.; GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 14, at 75-76. 
17. See Prichard, supra note 14. 
18. GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 14, at 4. 
19. For the locations of the wounds see id. 
20. Id. at 75-76. 
21. See Rick Bragg, Arkansas School Ambushed, ATLANTA CaNST., Mar. 25, 1998, at 
AI. 
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powered rifles to fire at their targets, who were unable to flee to the safety of 
the school building because of automatic locks to prevent entry during a fire. 
Both boys played violent video games,22 and the games may have 
provided effective training. While one of the boys did have experience with 
real weapons, there is no indication of similar experience for the other. Again, 
their accuracy and effectiveness were astounding. 
These two avid video game players fired a combined total of twenty-seven shots from 
a range of over one hundred yards, and hit fifteen people. They strategically trapped 
their victims, lined them up, and shot with deadly accuracy. Battle-scarred veterans 
and military analysts reacted with amazement atthe accuracy of their shooting, on one 
hand, and the military strategy involved in setting up their "kill zone," on the other. 
Both skills are taught by an array of home and arcade video games.23 
Aside from any effect of violent media in psychological development, the 
skills taught implicate video games in the killings. 
If video games are causing or contributing to the effectiveness of 
juvenile mass murderers, the effect may have just begun. While increased 
school security and limitations on the access of juveniles to firearms may 
reduce the likelihood of similar events, the effects of violent video games may 
well grow. Violent television and films have been with us for some time, and 
studies show a link to violence in the real world.24 Interestingly, the long-term 
effect may have a multi-year gap, with the growth of violence coming years 
after the exposure of children to media violence.25 For television that gap was 
in the neighborhood of fifteen years. Violent, first person shooter video 
games have not been with us anywhere near that long. If a similar gap exists 
for those games, the real growth in video game induced violence has yet to 
come. 
The issue of whether or not violent video games, and other violent 
media, do cause real world violence or otherwise harm the physical or 
psychological development of children will be discussed in the next section. 
It is sufficient here to note that concerns over such effects have been sufficient 
to motivate legislation aimed at controlling the exposure of minors to video 
game violence. Two jurisdictions have passed such legislation and others 
have considered similar limitations. 
In July 2000, the combined city and county council for the City of 
Indianapolis and Marion County adopted General Ordinance No. 72, which 
required that video arcades, with five or more games, take steps to limit access 
22. See Timothy Egan, Killing Sprees Tied by String of Youth Rage, THE DENVER POST, 
June 14, 1998, at 1 A. 
23. GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 14, at 76-77. 
24. See infra notes 57-98 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
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by minors, defined as those under eighteen, to games that are "harmful to 
minors. ,,26 Arcades had to separate games that are harmful to minors from 
other games and only allow children under eighteen to play if accompanied by 
a parent, guardian, or custodian. The ordinance also defined games that are 
"harmful to minors" as games with graphic violence or strong sexual content 
that appeal predominantly to minors' morbid interest in violence or prurient 
interest in sex, that are patently offensive under the standards of the adult 
community as to what is suitable for minors, and that taken as a whole lack 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. "Graphic 
violence" was further defined as the "depiction or representation of realistic 
serious injury to a human or human-like being where such serious injury 
includes amputation, decapitation, dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, 
maiming or disfiguration.'>27 
In October 2000, St. Louis County, Missouri passed a similar ordinance. 
Ordinance No. 20,193, like the Indianapolis ordinance, required that video 
arcade operators separate games that are "harmful to minors."28 Minors could 
not be admitted to the area containing such games, without the permission of 
a parent or guardian, nor could retailers sell or rent such video games to a 
minor not accompanied by a parent or guardian. "Harmful to minors" was 
defined so as to include the same sort of violent depictions addressed by the 
Indianapolis ordinance. The St. Louis ordinance did, however, address only 
a somewhat younger audience, those under seventeen. It also contained a 
rebuttable presumption that games rated by the video game industry's 
Entertainment Software Review Board as "M," for mature, or "AO," for adults 
only, are harmful to minors, while games rated "E," for everyone, "EC," for 
early childhood, or "T," for teen, are rebuttably presumed not to be harmful 
to minors. A similar rebuttable presumption applied to the alternative rating 
system developed by an industry group including the American Amusement 
Machines Association. "Red" rated games are presumed harmful, while 
"yellow" and "green" rated games are presumed not harmful to minors. 
Other jurisdictions considered similar ordinances but failed to enact 
them into law. A bill was introduced in the Oregon State Senate to limit 
26. The text ofthe ordinance is set forth in a case challenging its constitutionality. See 
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946-47 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
[hereinafter Am. Amusement Mach. 1], rev 'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 
(2001 ). 
27. Am. Amusement Mach. 1,115 F. Supp. 2d at 946 (citations omitted). The ordinance 
also defined "strong sexual content" to include "nudity or explicit human sexual behavior by 
any human or human-like being in one or more of the following forms: masturbation; deviate 
sexual conduct; sexual intercourse; or, fondling of genitals." Id. at 947 (citations omitted). 
28. For the ordinance, see Interactive Digital Software Ass 'n v. St. Louis County, 200 
F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
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violent video game play in arcades.29 The Mississippi State Senate also 
considered a bill that would have limited sale, rental, or arcade play,30 as did 
the House of the Georgia General Assembly.31 In Connecticut, a similar bill, 
addressing arcade play by those under eighteen passed through the 
legislature,32 but failed to gain the governor's support. In Oklahoma, a similar 
bill passed in the senate, but the house refused to consider the bill,33 and 
eventually a weaker bill amended existing law addressing the distribution to 
minors of material with strong sexual content to include video games 
containing sadomasochistic depictions.34 
The issue of the exposure of children to violent video games has also 
recently attracted congressional attention. Representative Joe Baca, with 
twenty-one cosponsors, introduced a bill titled the Protect Children from 
Video Game Sex and Violence Act of 2002.35 The bill would have prohibited 
the sale or rental to a minor, defined as seventeen and younger, of any video 
game depicting: 
(I) decapitation, amputation, dismemberment, or mutilation; 
(2) the killing of human beings or human-like beings by the use of an object as a 
lethal weapon or hand-to-hand fighting; 
(3) the car jacking ofa vehicle; 
(4) the use of illegal drugs; 
(5) rape or other sexual assault; 
(6) prostitution; 
(7) aggravated assault or battery; or 
(8) any other violent feJony.36 
29. See Lisa Grace Lednicer, Bill Would Zap Teen Use of Violent Games, THE 
OREGONIAN, Feb. 20,2001, at AI, available at 2001 WL 3586962. 
30. See S. 2048, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2000),2002 WL 4897987. 
31. See H.R. 1378, I 46th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2001), 2001 GA H.B. 1378. 
32. See Carrie Budoff, Lawmakers Take Aim at Video Games: Rowland's Approval 
Needed On Bill Targeting Violent Images, HARTFORD COURANT, May 17,2001, at AI. 
33. See Brian Ford, Violent-Video Bills Appear Dead, TuLSA WORLD, Apr. 1,2001, at 
17. 
34. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1040.75 (West Supp. 2001). 
35. See H.R. 4645, 107th Congo (2002). 
36. /d. 
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The efforts to limit exposure to violent video games have met with only 
limited success in the courts. The Indianapolis and St. Louis County 
ordinances were quickly challenged by the video games industry. In both 
cases, federal district courts refused to enjoin the enforcement of the 
ordinances. The Indianapolis ordinance was, however, not as well received 
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which ordered 
that an injunction be entered. 
The Indianapolis district court case was styled American Amusement 
Machine Ass 'n v. Kendrick. 37 The video game industry had requested an 
injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance on the grounds that it 
violated the First Amendment. The court accepted the position that at least 
some video games enjoy the protection of the amendment, but concluded that 
the plaintiffs were unlikely to be able to show that the ordinance was 
unconstitutional. The ordinance did not limit the access of adults to the games 
at issue and the scope of children's right to access is more limited than adult 
rights. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Ginsberg v. New 
York,38 holding that sexual material not obscene for an adult audience can be 
considered obscene when distributed to minors. Application of the case 
requires the equation of sexual material and depictions of violence, but the 
court was willing to take that step, stating "the court is not persuaded there is 
any principled constitutional difference between sexually explicit material and 
graphic violence, at least when it comes to providing such material to 
children.,,39 That conclusion that violence can be subsumed under the variable 
obscenity standard of Ginsberg, coupled with what the court recognized as 
strong interests in limiting the harmful effects of violent video games on 
children, justified the ordinance. 
The district court decision was appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and the industry fared far better there. An 
opinion by Judge Posner rejected the inclusion of depictions of violence 
within the category of the obscene, concluding that the two are "distinct 
categories of objectionable depiction."40 In Judge Posner's view, obscenity 
is limited because the community finds it offensive, while Indianapolis was 
motivated by a concern that violent video games cause aggressive real world 
behavior.41 It is far from clear, however, that those who object to sexually 
37. 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (S.D. Ind. 2000), rev 'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 994 (2001). 
38. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
39. Am. Amusement Mach. I, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 946. 
40. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir.) 
[hereinafter Am. Amusement Mach. II], cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001) (citations omitted). 
41. See Am. Amusement Mach. II, 244 F.3d at 574. 
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obscene materials do so solely out of a sense of being offended. Concerns, 
especially regarding the provision of such material to youth, can just as well 
focus on a concern that the children seeing the material will engage in sexual 
activity inappropriate for their age. Neither is it clear that the members of a 
community such as Indianapolis cannot feel offended by the exposure of 
children to media violence. 
Since the appellate court concluded that the games, even those with 
strong violent content, are protected, the ordinance had to stand up to strict 
scrutiny; the ordinance had to address a compelling governmental interest and 
be narrowly tailored to that interest.42 Indianapolis's interest was in 
preventing real world youth violence resulting from playing violent video 
games. Judge Posner rejected the link between video games and the real 
world, concluding that the social science evidence did not support the 
ordinance.43 Violence is found in other contexts and there was no justification 
for singling video games out from a background of violent images for special 
treatment. "The studies do not find that video games have ever caused anyone 
to commit a violent act, as opposed to feeling aggressive, or have caused the 
average level of violence to increase anywhere.,,44 The court seemed to 
assume that the access of children to violent films could not be restricted and 
concluded that there was no justification, including the interactive nature of 
video games, to distinguish the games from such other media.4s Despite a 
great deal of empirical evidence supporting the concern that exposure of 
children to images of violence makes the world a more violent place and the 
conclusions of major health organizations that media violence plays a 
causative role in real world violence,46 Judge Posner concluded that 
"[c]ommon sense says that the City's claim of harm to its citizens from these 
games is implausible, at best wildly speculative."47 
The St. Louis County ordinance also fared well at the federal district 
court level. There, too, the video game industry sought an injunction against 
the enforcement of the ordinance, and the court refused the request. The 
court, in Interactive Digital Software Ass 'n v. St. Louis County,48 examined 
three theories under which the ordinance would be valid. The court rejected 
42. See id. at 576. 
43. See id. 
44. [d. at 578-79. 
45. See id. at 579. 
46. That evidence is discussed infra notes 57-98 and accompanying text, and the 
statement of the health organizations is presented infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
47. Am. Amusement Mach. 11,244 F.3d at 579. 
48. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002). An appeal has been filed with the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. 
Louis County, No. 02-3010 (8th Cir. filed Sept. 18, 2002). 
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the county's claim that violence could be considered obscene, at least when 
made available to minors, since it saw that theory as having been rejected for 
video tapes by the federal appellate court of its circuit in Video Software 
Dealers Ass'n v. Webster.49 With regard to the hann such games can cause, 
the court was greatly at odds with Judge Posner's view.50 While Judge Posner 
may have seen such claims as implausible, in Judge Limbaugh's view "[f]or 
plaintiffs to ... argue that violent video games are not hannful to minors is 
simply incredulous."51 In the St. Louis court's view, the county had a 
compelling interest in protecting minors from that hann and the ordinance was 
narrowly tailored to that interest, since it affected only those potential players 
who are under seventeen and who have not obtained their parents' pennission 
to play.52 
The most interesting aspect of the St. Louis opinion, however, was its 
conclusion that video games simply do not enjoy the protections of the First 
Amendment.53 Video games do not involve communication necessary for the 
Constitution's free expression guarantees to apply. Rather than having the 
protection of entertainment fonns such as motion pictures, video games were 
said to be more akin to board games or bingo.54 Games such as bingo, 
blackjack, and baseball are not forms of expression, and none of them become 
fonns of expression simply because the action occurs through buttons and joy 
sticks, rather than cards and wooden or aluminum bats. Without the 
protection ofthe First Amendment, the ordinance could clearly stand up to the 
rationality requirements of laws that do not infringe on the constitutional 
rights of the individual. 
Since the Indianapolis and St. Louis ordinances are likely to be just the 
first of many to come and since each new effort will likely lead to litigation, 
the arguments raised in the cases discussed merit consideration. The three 
theories potentially justifying video game restrictions will be discussed in 
turn, beginning with the theory that requires the least contraction of first 
amendment theory. That theory turns on the violence inducing effects of 
violent video games. If the interest in protecting children is compelling and 
the danger is real, an ordinance narrowly addressed to that issue is 
constitutional under generally applicable constitutional doctrine. The second 
approach to be addressed will be the theory that depictions of violence can 
come within an existing exception to first amendment protection, the 
49. 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992). 
50. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1992). 
51. Interactive Digital Software, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1138. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
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obscenity exception. Ifviolence can be obscene, then the degree of violence 
present in some video games could come within a violence application of the 
variable obscenity standard employed when materials are made available to 
children. That is, even if adults should be allowed to play, children can be 
restricted. Lastly, the position that video games are not expression and do not 
enjoy first amendment protection will be examined. The position taken here 
will be that each of the three arguments is valid, that is, that any of the three 
justifications suffices to justify restricting the access of minors to violent 
video games. The last section of the article will address the drafting of 
statutes imposing restrictions and how the justification adopted affects the 
structure of the statute or ordinance. 
I. VIDEO GAMES AND REAL WORLD VIOLENCE - MEETING STRICT 
SCRUTINY 
The issue of whether or not violent video games cause real world 
violence is important because the conclusion that there is causation could 
justify restrictions on video game access, even if the games have the full 
protection of the First Amendment. The Webster court did strike down a 
limitation on distributing violent videos to minors and found that violent 
materials are protected by the First Amendment, but the court did not 
conclude that such materials are absolutely protected. The enjoyment of the 
protections of the expression clauses requires only that the limitation be 
judged against the strict scrutiny standard. It must be narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling governmental interest. The court there was willing to 
recognize a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological 
well-being of minors but concluded that the statute was not narrowly drawn 
to serve that interest. 55 The statute failed to state with particularity the types 
of violence that the legislature determined to be detrimental to minors, so the 
court could not determine if the statute was narrowly drawn to ban only that 
expression.56 If violent video games do not cause real world violence, as 
Judge Posner indicated, then a compelling interest may well be lacking. Even 
if they do cause such violence, Webster cautions that any restrictive legislation 
must be drafted so to focus narrowly on the video games that contribute to the 
danger. 
55. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1992). 
56. See Video Software Dealers Ass 'n, 968 F.2d at 686. 
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A. Research on the Effects of Violence in Other Media 
Violent video games are a relatively recent phenomenon, and the 
research on the effects of violent video games is only beginning to develop. 
There is, however, a great body of social science literature on the effects of 
television and film violence. There may be differences between the effects on 
passive exposure to violence in the media that one simply watches and the 
more active role of the video game player. Nonetheless, the video game 
player is also a watcher ofthe action. Whatever effects such passive exposure 
have should also be present in video games, with perhaps additional effects as 
well. The studies on the passive media are then relevant to the issue of the 
effect of violent video games on real world violence. With the passive media 
there is a large body of social science research that supports the contention 
that media violence in general causes violence in the real world. 
The science regarding the effects of film and television falls into three 
categories; laboratory studies, field studies, and correlation studies.57 
Laboratory studies consist of observations of individuals in a controlled 
environment and constituted the early research on the effects of media 
violence. Professor Bandura directed what has become the classic study.58 He 
worked with a group of nursery school children given the opportunity to play 
with an inflated five foot Bobo doll, a doll that stands back up when knocked 
over. Before playing with the doll, different groups of children saw an adult 
hitting and kicking it, a film of the same acts, or a film of the same actions 
made to appear as a cartoon. There was also a control group not exposed to 
the actual or filmed play with the doll. The children were then frustrated or 
mildly angered by showing them some toys and telling them that they could 
not play with those toys because they were being saved for other children. 
They were then allowed to play with a different group of toys, both non-
aggressive toys and aggressive toys, including a Bobo doll. The researchers 
rated the levels of aggression shown by the children in their play with the toys. 
The three experimental groups were significantly more aggressive, almost 
twice the level of aggression, compared to the control groUp.59 
This media induction of aggression is not limited to preschool age 
children. Male university students were the subjects of a series of studies led 
57. For a more detailed discussion of the social science see KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, 
VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY: LIMITING THE MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 29-44 
(1996). 
58. See Albert Bandura et aI., Imitation of Film-Mediated Aggressive Models, 66 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 3 (1963). 
59. See id. 
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by Professor Leonard Berkowitz.60 His studies also examined the effect of 
meaning and context. Groups of students were shown one of three films and 
the context of the action in each of the violent films in the studies was 
explained in two ways. Two groups of students saw an excerpt from the film 
Champion in which a character played by Kirk Douglas is badly beaten in a 
boxing match. One of those groups was told that the film involved two 
professional prize fighters simply fighting for a purse. The other was told 
Douglas' opponent was angry and wanted to injure him. A second film 
involved a football game, with one group told it was just a professional contest 
and another told that one team had a particular reason to want to beat the 
other. The last group was a control group shown what was described as an 
exciting film of a track race.61 Before they saw the films, the subjects were 
given reason to be somewhat angry toward an assigned partner said to be 
another subject of the study but actually a part of the research team. After the 
film, they were told to rate the ideas offered by their partners by administering 
electric shocks. The groups that had seen the "aggressive meaning" film 
administered significantly more shocks and shocks of longer duration. 
These studies, and others like them, can and have been criticized.62 The 
most serious question is over whether or not laboratory results carry over to 
the real world. The children in the Bobo doll experiment may have taken the 
acts they had seen as instruction on how to play with that particular toy or at 
least as providing permission to do what they had seen adults do. Of course, 
if the same is said of media violence it does not defeat claims of causation, 
since the media would be seen as showing that violent acts are acceptable and 
as providing instruction on social interaction. For video games, as discussed 
below, the instructive aspects may be particularly strong. It may also be 
argued that the laboratory studies really measure compliance with the 
investigator, rather than induced aggression.63 That, however, would require 
awareness of the behavior the researcher desired, and Berkowitz controlled for 
60. See Leonard Berkowitz & Joseph T. Alioto, The Meaning of an Observed Event as 
a Determinant of Its Aggressive Consequences, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 206 
(1973). 
61. The study refers to this film as "our standard 6-minute movie of a track race." Id. 
at 209. It appears to be of a race between the first two runners to break the four minute mile. 
Berkowitz used that film in other studies. See, e.g., Leonard Berkowitz & Russell G. Geen, 
Film Violence and the Cue Properties of Available Targets, 3 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
525,527 (1966). 
62. See, e.g., MARCIA PAllY, SEX & SENSIBILITY: REFLECTIONS ON FORBIDDEN 
MIRRORS AND THE WIll TO CENSOR 28-29,88-93 (1994). 
63. See id. at 93. 
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this by including as a factor in the results awareness of the purpose of the 
study.64 
Field studies may be less subject to the criticism that the results do not 
carry over to the real world, because they involve real world settings. On the 
other hand, because they occur outside the laboratory, they are not as 
amenable to the controls available there. Because of this lack of controls and 
because the settings seem somewhat artificial, there is disagreement over the 
conclusions to be drawn. A Belgian study presents an example of that 
disagreement. Two groups of institutionalized boys were shown either violent 
or nonviolent films for a period of one week. The aggressiveness of the 
members of the groups was then rated.65 Looking at the results, Professor 
Jonathan Freedman,66 a skeptic regarding television's causative role in 
violence, and Professors Lynette Friedrich-Cofer and Aletha Huston,67 who 
seem to accept such effects, came to very different conclusions. According 
to Friedrich-Cofer and Huston: 
In the Belgian study, physical aggression increased significantly ... in both 
cottages assigned to violent films, but did not increase in the neutral film cottages. 
Total aggression, including both physical and verbal aggression, increased primarily 
in the violent film cottage that was initially more aggressive. In two U.S. studies total 
aggression was significantly higher in two cottages viewing television violence for 5 
days than in cottages viewing neutral films.68 
Freedman, however, finds only "some evidence to support the causal 
hypothesis."69 He concludes his analysis as follows: 
[I]t does seem that [one of the experiments] found a consistent increase in 
aggressiveness for one cottage and a short-term increase on one measure forthe other, 
and [a second] study found a greater increase in aggressiveness after violent films 
than after nonviolent films. The interpretation ofthe results of[ a third] study depends 
on which analysis one accepts. At most, there is rather weak evidence for a greater 
64. See Berkowitz & Alioto, supra note 60, at 210-11. 
65. For the studies examined see Jacques-Philippe Leyens et aI., Effects of Movie 
Violence on Aggression in a Field Setting as a Function of Group Dominance and CoheSion, 
32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 346 (1975); Ross D. Parke et aI., Some Effects of Violent 
and Nonviolent Movies on the Behavior of Juvenile Delinquents, in 10 ADVANCES IN 
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 135 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1977). 
66. See Jonathan L. Freedman, Effect of Television Violence on Aggressiveness, 96 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 227 (1984). 
67. See Lynette Friedrich-Cofer & Aletha C. Huston, Television Violence and 
Aggression: The Debate Continues, 100 PSYCHOL. BULL. 364 (1986). Professors Friedrich-
Cofer and Huston's article is written in part as a response to Professor Freedman. 
68. Id. at 365. 
69. Freedman, supra note 66, at 231. 
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increase in aggressiveness following violent films; at worst, there are no main effects, 
but perhaps a differential increase for low-aggressive boys only.7o 
65 
He questions even these results, because the study treated the subjects 
as independent of each other, while aggression on the part of one of the boys 
may have been the real cause of aggression in others. 
Addressing the totality of field studies, Freedman says there is "only the 
slightest encouragement for the causal hypothesis" and he finds even that 
slightest support to be questionable. 71 Friedrich-Cofer and Huston, in contrast, 
conclude that there is "a moderately consistent pattern suggesting an effect of 
television violence on aggression and self-control, particularly for subjects 
with relatively high baseline levels of aggression.'>72 They even suggest that 
there may be an underestimation of the causal effects of television violence 
in the field studies, because of the inhibiting presence of the adult 
experimenters. 73 
The last variety of the older social science experiments is the 
correlational study, a real world study of populations examining relations 
between demographic variables, either looking at different populations at one 
point in time or the same population over an extended period. One of the first 
such studies in the area was Dr. Brandon Centerwall's examination of the 
introduction of television and the homicide rate in which he found a 
correlation between the increase in televisions and a ten to fifteen year later 
rise in the homicide rate.74 In both the United States and Canada the curve 
representing increased numbers of televisions in the 1950s was roughly 
parallel to the curve representing increased homicide rates in the late 1960s.75 
South Africa did not show the same increase in the late 1960s, and it is 
interesting to note that television was not available there until the 1970s. 
Similar results were obtained in an even earlier study of a small, isolated 
Canadian town that had no television until 1973.76 Groups of first and second 
graders there and in two other towns that were similar, except in that 
television was already present, were observed over a two year period. In the 
70. [d. 
71. /d. at 234. 
72. Friedrich-Cofer & Huston, supra note 67, at 366. 
73. See id. 
74. See Brandon S. Centerwall, Television and Violence: The Scale of the Problem and 
Where to Go From Here, 267 JAMA 3059 (1992). 
75. See id. Centerwall suggested that the delay was because homicide is an adult 
behavior and television's effect on children would require a ten to fifteen year incubation 
period. See id. 
76. See Lesley A. Joy et aI., Television and Children 's Aggressive Behavior, in THE 
IMPACT OF TELEVISION: A NATURAL EXPERIMENT IN THREE COMMUNITIES 303 (Tannis MacBeth 
Williams ed., 1986). 
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towns that had already had television there were no significant behavioral 
changes, but in the town new to television, there was a significant increase in 
physical aggression on the part of the town's children. 
Demographic studies also have their problems, centering on the 
difficulty of controlling variables in the real world and on the sheer number 
of variables present, especially in studies that occur over an extended period 
of time. That possibility of the effects of uncontrolled variables lessens the 
surety with which results can be accepted. As an example, in Dr. Centerwall' s 
study the increase in televisions was not the only relevant change in the time 
period studied. The increase in the homicide rate occurred in the years in 
which the baby boom population passed through their teens and early 
twenties, the ages when a person is most likely to be violent.77 Marcia Pally 
also points to a problem comparing the United States and Canadian results 
with South Africa. 78 South Africa saw very strong governmental control in the 
1970s and, she suggests, a siege mentality among South African whites and 
a better economy in the relevant years may explain the differences. Pallyalso 
raises questions over the study ofthe introduction of television to the isolated 
Canadian town, since Canadian television was not very violent at the time.79 
An example of a long term demographic study is found in the work of 
Doctors Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder, and Huesmann.80 Their study began in 
1955 by examining all the third graders in Columbia County, New York, using 
data from the children's parents and classmates and the children themselves. 
The children were rated for aggressiveness, based on classmate assessments 
of disobedience to the teacher, fighting, taking things from others, and other 
similar acts. The experimenters also interviewed parents to find the children's 
television viewing habits and to gain input on some forty other variables 
concerning personality, intelligence, social status, and family situation. The 
same students were studied when in the eighth grade and after high school 
graduation. The results showed that watching violent television in the third 
grade was correlated, to a statistically significant degree, to aggressiveness in 
the third grade and even more significantly to aggressiveness after high 
school. 
77. This point is made by Marcia Pally in her criticism of the social science on 
television causing aggression. See PAllY, supra note 62, at \08-09. 
78. See id. at 109. 
79. See id. at 112. 
80. See Monroe M. Lefkowitz et aI., Television Violence and Child Aggression: A 
Followup Study, in TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: REPORTS AND PAPERS, VOL. III: 
TELEVISION AND ADOLESCENT AGGRESSIVENESS 35 (George A. Comstock & Eli A. Rubinstein 
eds., 1972). 
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Once again, the study is not beyond criticism. It may be that those who 
are disposed toward aggression also choose to watch violent television and 
that the television violence then did not cause aggression. The study, 
however, concluded that violent television causes aggression, because there 
was no correlation found between aggressiveness in third grade and later 
watching of violent television. s1 There is also valid criticism of the grouping 
of the television programs considered violent. Gun Smoke or The Man from 
UN C.L.E. are certainly reasonably considered violent television shows, but 
the inclusion of the slapstick of the Three Stooges or the comedy of Get Smart 
may have made the category overly broad.s2 Furthermore, cartoons and soap 
operas were classified as nonviolent, but cartoons have long faced criticism 
for their violence. It is worth noting that this criticism is directed only at 
causal claims. The correlational studies do establish at least a correlation 
between television violence and aggressive behavior, as recognized even by 
causal skeptics such as Freedman.s3 
Any single study may be criticized, and each variety of study has its 
weaknesses, but the body of research taken as a whole provides a strong basis 
for the conclusion that media violence causes violence in the real world. That 
strength is demonstrated through meta-analysis, which applies quantitative 
techniques to examine all the studies in the scholarly literature and provides 
an objective synthesis of that research. If an analysis shows that the results 
are consistent from study to study and from method to method, the conclusion 
is certainly greatly strengthened. In the early 1990s, Professors Comstock and 
Paik examined almost two hundred methodologically sound studies, both 
published and unpublished, studying the relationship between television 
81. See id. at 49. The statistical methods used in arriving at this conclusion were 
questioned by Professor David Kenny. He did, however, also conclude that the data, using what 
he took to be the proper approach, did demonstrate the conclusion that violent television causes 
aggression, but with a lesser degree of statistical significance. See David A. Kenny, Threats to 
the Internal Validity of Cross-Lagged Panel Inference. as Related to "Television Violence and 
Child Aggression: A Fol/owup Study", in TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: REPORTS AND 
PAPERS, VOL. III: TELEVISION AND ADOLESCENT AGGRESSIVENESS 136 (George A. Comstock 
& Eli A. Rubinstein eds., 1972). Professor John Neale, using still different techniques, also 
found support for the original conclusion. See John M. Neale, Comment on "Television 
Violence and Child Aggression: A Fol/owup Study", in TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: 
REPORTS AND PAPERS, VOL. III: TELEVISION AND ADOLESCENT AGGRESSIVESNESS 14 I (George 
A. Comstock & Eli A. Rubinstein eds., 1972). 
82. This argument is similarto that made by Professor William McGuire, who expresses 
concern that a murder scores no higher as an incidence of violence than pushing or restraining 
a person, slapstick comic violence, and cartoon conflicts. See William J. McGuire, The Myth 
of Massive Media Impact: Savagings and Salvagings, in I PUBLIC COMMUNICATION AND 
BEHAVIOR 173, 191 (George Comstock ed., 1986). 
83. See Freedman, supra note 66, at 243. 
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violence and aggressive behavior.84 Based on their meta-analysis, the authors 
concluded that the studies, in the aggregate, show that television violence 
increases aggressive behavior of all types, including criminal behavior.8s 
Even meta-analysis may be criticized, and the relevance of the 
conclusions drawn by Comstock and Paik has been questioned.86 The 
criticism was not of the analysis employed but concerned the size ofthe effect 
that can be demonstrated. Even accepting the statistical significance of the 
relationship between viewing violence and aggressive behavior, if the 
contribution of television to aggression is small, then the effect of television 
may be seen as not being worth addressing. The response to this criticism is 
that even a small increase in aggression may push those most prone to 
violence actually to commit violent acts or even homicide. 
Despite shortcomings in any given experiment, the aggregate of social 
science and psychological research clearly demonstrates a connection between 
media violence generally and real world violence. That is not to claim that 
every child who watches television or plays violent video games will go out 
and commit violence, but neither will every person who smokes develop lung 
cancer. Nonetheless, six major professional organizations in the health field 
found the science conclusive. In a joint statement, issued in July 2000, the 
American Psychological Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, 
the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the American 
Medical Association, the American Academy of Family Physicians, and the 
American Psychiatric Association concluded that "well over 1000 
studies . . . point overwhelmingly to a causal connection between media 
violence and aggressive behavior in some children.,,87 
The American Academy of Pediatrics had in an earlier policy statement 
said that "[t]he vast majority of studies conclude that there is a cause-and-
effect relationship between media violence and real-life violence. ,,88 It called 
the link "undeniable and uncontestable.,,89 A representative of the same 
pediatrics group, in the year 2000, testified before the United States Senate 
Commerce Committee that there are now more than 3,500 studies examining 
the relationship between media and real world violence and that "[a]ll but 18 
84. See Haejung Paik & George Comstock, The Effects of Television Violence on 
Antisocial Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 21 COMM. REs. 516 (\994). 
85. See id. 
86. See PALLY, supra note 62, at 93-97. 
87. American Academy of Pediatrics, Joint Statement on the Impact of Entertainment 
Violence on Children: Congressional Public Health Summit para. 4 (July 26,2000), available 
at http://www.aap.orgladvocacy/releasesljstmtevc.htm. 
88. American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Communications, Media Violence, 
95 PEDIATRICS 949,949 (1995). 
89. Id. 
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have shown a positive correlation between media exposure and violent 
behavior" and that epidemiological studies conclude that "exposure to violent 
media was a factor in half of the 10,000 homicides committed in the United 
States in [the year studied.]"90 
The view ofthe scientific community seems to be that the debate is over 
and that it is clear that there is a connection between media violence and 
aggression in the real world. The Surgeon General's report, Youth Violence, 
noted that ethical considerations bar the use of the sort of randomized studies 
that are best used to determine causation. Nonetheless, the report reaches the 
conclusion that "a diverse body of research provides strong evidence that 
exposure to violence in the media can increase children's aggressive behavior 
in the short term."91 While less secure in concluding that there is a causal 
connection to violence in the long term, the report does find a "small but 
statistically significant impact on aggression over many years.,,92 Again, 
remember that that conclusion was based on the passive media, and the active 
engagement in virtual violence in video games would seem likely to have an 
even greater effect.93 
Given the evidence on the causal effects of media violence, the disjoint 
between science and what seems to be the perception of at least a portion of 
the public that there is no causation seems puzzling. It is not surprising that 
the media continues to deny any causation. Media executives will, like 
tobacco executives for lung cancer, be the last to admit such a connection. 
The difference between the effectiveness of the denials on the part of the two 
industries may be that the media industry also controls the outlets through 
which the public gains the information necessary to form its views. A recent 
study, published in the American Psychological Association's journal 
American Psychologist, finds a "disheartening" discrepancy between science 
and media reporting.94 "As it became clearer to the scientific community that 
media violence effects were real and significant, the news media reports 
actually got weaker."95 The authors report instances in which Newsweek and 
90. Testimony of the American Academy of Pediatrics on Media Violence before the 
u.s. Senate Commerce Committee para. 4 (September 13,2000) (statement of Donald E. Cook, 
M.D., President, American Academy of Pediatrics), at http://commerce.senate.gov/ 
hearingsl0913coo. pdf. 
91. Youth Violence: A Report to the Surgeon General para. 4 app. 4-B, at 
http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/chapter4/appendix4bsec3.html(last 
visited Mar. 12, 2003). 
92. /d. at para. I. 
93. See infra notes 99-121 and accompanying text. 
94. See Brad J. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Media Violence and the American 
Public: Scientific Facts Versus Media Misinformation, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 477, 485 (2001). 
95. /d. 
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The New York Times published articles or op-eds claiming that there was no 
causative evidence and then would not publish replies from the scientific 
community.96 
It can, of course, be claimed that all the scientific evidence is able to 
show is correlation rather than causation. That may seem like a reasonable 
argument, but it does not really weaken the scientific conclusion. As 
empiricists since David Hume note, one can never observe causation but only 
a form of correlation Hume called constant conjunction.97 The constancy of 
that conjunction, the perfect correlation, may make one more secure in 
drawing the causal conclusion, but there is a jump from observation to 
conclusion. That jump may be less justified when the conjunction is not 
constant, but it is one the scientific community makes with regularity. There 
is only an imperfect correlation between smoking and lung cancer, between 
unprotected sex and AIDS, and between low calcium intake and osteoporosis. 
That is, not everyone who smokes gets lung cancer and some who get lung 
cancer did not smoke, and the same is true for the other relations involving 
AIDS and osteoporosis. Yet, those relations are seen confidently as causal. 
The failure to accept the correlation as causation in the case of media 
violence is not due to the degree of correlation. The correlation between 
media violence and aggression is stronger than that offailure to use a condom 
and HN, second hand smoke and lung cancer, lead exposure in children and 
lower IQs, use of the nicotine patch and smoking cessation, calcium intake and 
bone mass, homework and academic achievement, asbestos exposure and 
cancer of the larynx, and self-examination and early detection of breast 
cancer.98 While the correlation between smoking and lung cancer is more 
significant than that between media violence and aggression, the acceptance 
of all these lesser correlations as indicating causation lead to the conclusion 
that the correlation in the case of the media ought also to be considered 
sufficient to allow society to proceed on the assumption that there is 
causation. 
One last objection that might be made has to do with the mechanism of 
causation. Perhaps there is a greater willingness to conclude that there is 
causation in the case of second hand smoke or lack of condom use because the 
mechanisms bringing about the results are more easily understood. The brain 
is, to most if not all of us, mysterious, but so is the rest of science, if the 
analysis is sufficiently deep. It is clear to all that gravity causes objects to fall 
to the earth, but try explaining, even to yourself, why it is that objects with 
96. See id. at 486. 
97. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 86-94 (L. A. Se\by-Bigge ed., 
Oxford 1964)( 1888). 
98. See Bushman & Anderson, supra note 94, at 481. 
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mass attract each other. Most of us, having experienced even mild visceral 
effects from viewing violence, would have a better understanding of how that 
exposure might lead some to have a sufficiently strong response as to lead to 
violence or to experience a sufficiently long lasting effect as to be more 
aggressive in the future. 
B. Causation and Video Games 
Moving from the passive media such as television and film to the active 
participation of video games, it would seem reasonable to expect an increase 
in the causative effect of that variety of media violence. The interactivity of 
the violent video game in which the player himself responds using virtual 
violence would seem more likely to lead the player to respond with violence 
in future situations than would simply viewing characters on a screen. Judge 
Posner, however, called that distinction "superficial." 
Maybe video games are different. They are, after all, interactive. But this point is 
superficial, in fact erroneous. All literature (here broadly defined to include movies, 
television, and the other photographic media, and popular as well as highbrow 
literature) is interactive; the better it is, the more interactive. Literature when it is 
successful draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with the characters, 
invites him to judge them and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and 
sufferings as the reader's own.99 
But rather than that distinction being superficial, Posner's response is an 
equivocation, an argument that relies on two different uses of a word. To say 
that literature is interactive because the reader empathizes with a character is 
a far cry from interactivity in the sense of participation in the action. It is the 
difference between being a member of the audience at a play and being part 
of the cast ofthat play. The actor interacts with the others in the cast, and that 
is different from any empathy the audience may feel. The interactivity of a 
flight simulator is a qualitatively different experience, and one more likely to 
lead to a response in actual flight, than reading a flight manual, watching one 
99. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th CiT.) 
[hereinafter Am. Amusement Mach. II], cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001). 
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of the Airport movies, or reading the most engaging descriptions penned by 
pilots. 100 
The research on the effects of violent video games has not developed to 
the point where it matches that on the effects of film or television. Video 
games, and in particular the violent, first person shooter games in a realistic 
graphics environment, are simply too new a medium to match the extensive 
research on the older media. There would, however, appear to be nothing 
about those other media that would prevent the export of their conclusions to 
video games, and there are at least speculative reasons, based on interactivity, 
to suggest that the causative results would be even stronger. 
While not as fully developed, 101 research on the modem variety of video 
games has begun. Professors Craig Anderson and Karen Dill recently 
published the first scientific comparison of the aggressiveness producing 
effects of violent and nonviolent video games, 102 and the results are similar to 
studies comparing violent and nonviolent television or film. Their effort 
proceeded on two fronts, one a correlational/demographic variable study and 
the other a laboratory experiment. In the correlational study they examined 
227 university students. The students were questioned both on their total 
exposure to video games and their specific exposure to violent video games 
in the present, eleventh and twelfth grade, ninth and tenth grade, and seventh 
100. Even accepting Judge Posner's point as to the interactivity of good literature or film, 
the argument that violent video games are particularly dangerous still holds. Even if the 
experience is not qualitatively different, the quantitative difference in identification through 
participation may make the experience more likely to produce aggression. Studies have shown 
that subjects who identify with a media aggressor are more likely to become aggressive than 
subjects not so inclined. See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, Video Games and 
Aggressive Thoughts. Feelings. and Behavior in the Laboratory and in Life, 78 J. PERSONALITY 
&SOC. PSYCHOL. 772 (2000) (citing Jacques-Philippe Leyens & Steve Picus, Identification with 
the Winner of a Fight and Name Mediation: Their Differential Effects upon Subsequent 
Aggressive Behaviour, 12 BRIT. J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 374 (\ 973». 
1O\. There is earlier research on the effects of violent video games, but the rapid 
evolution of the games in their capacity to convey realistic depictions of deadly violence against 
persons makes the older studies less relevant. For example, a study of children playing 
Activision Boxing compared to others playing Atari Boxing, see Daniel Graybill et aL, Effects 
of Playing Violent Versus Nonviolent Video Games on the Aggressive Ideation of Aggressive 
and Nonaggressive Children, 15 CHILD STUDY J. 199 (1985), or comparing those playing Pac-
Man with those playing Missle Command, see Joel Cooper & Diane Mackie, Video Games and 
Aggression in Children, 16 J. ApPLIED SOc. PSYCHOL. 726 (1986), cannot measure the effects 
of clearly more violent and more realistic modem games. These earlier games are simply not 
as violent, and as the authors of the latter study indicate, the children may not really see any 
significant difference in level of violence between Pac-Man eating or being eaten by ghosts and 
Missle Command's shooting down of invading alien space ships. See Cooper & Mackie, supra, 
at 740-4\' 
102. See Anderson & Dill, supra note 100. 
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and eighth grades. A number of instruments were also administered to 
measure their irritability, physical and verbal aggression, anger, hostility and 
history of delinquent acts. Anderson and Dill's analysis of the data led them 
to conclude that violent video game play was more strongly correlated with 
delinquency than nonviolent video game play and that "concern about the 
deleterious effects of violent video games on delinquent behavior, aggressive 
and nonaggressive, is legitimate. Playing violent video games often may well 
cause increases in delinquent behaviors, both aggressive and 
nonaggressive."103 They were, however, reluctant to draw a conclusion as to 
causation from a correlational study.l04 
The second laboratory study involved the video game Woifenstein 3D. 
The game is described in the study as having "blatant violent content, realism, 
and human characters."105 
[T]he human hero can choose from an array of weaponry including a revolver, a 
knife, automatic weapons, and a flame thrower. The hero's goal is to use these 
weapons to kill Nazi guards in Castle Wolfenstein to advance through a number of 
levels; the ultimate goal is to kill Adolph Hitler. The graphics ... are very violent; 
a successful player will see multiple bloody murders and hear victims scream and 
groan .... [T]he 3D setting is realistic. 106 
While a pilot study considered two other nonviolent video games, Myst and 
Tetris, as controls, Myst was used in the actual study because of its match with 
Woifenstein 3D with regard to the similar blood pressure and heart rates of 
players playing the two games and similar difficulty, enjoyment, frustration, 
and action levels of the two games. 107 
The study involved 210 university students selected on the basis of an 
earlier administered irritability scale. From that instrument, the top quarter 
and bottom quarter were invited to participate, resulting in a pool oflow and 
high irritability subjects. The students were then grouped into four 
populations: high irritability males, high irritability females, low irritability 
males, and low irritability females. Each of these groups was split into two 
groups, one playing Woifenstein 3D and the other playing Myst. Each person 
played the assigned game three times, with differing psychological 
instruments administered after the first two games. After the third game, the 
subjects were told that they would participate in a competitive reaction time 
103. [d. at 782. 
104. See id. 
105. [d. at 783. 
106. [d. 
107. See id. Male players did report that they found Wolfenstein 3D more exciting then 
Myst, despite the similar physical responses; the view was not shared by female subjects. See 
Anderson & Dill, supra note 100, at 786. 
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task in which they tried to push a button faster than their opponents. The 
game was controlled so that the participant subjects all won thirteen of the 
twenty-five trials. When they lost, they were subjected to a blast of noise at 
a level said to be set by the opponent but actually controlled by the 
experimenters. Each subject, prior to each trial, set the duration and intensity 
of the noise blast his or her opponent would hear, if the participant won the 
trial. After each trial, the participant was shown the noise level said to have 
been selected by the opponent. The results showed that "participants who had 
played Wolfenstein 3D delivered significantly longer noise blasts after lose 
trials than those who had played the nonviolent game Myst. ... In other 
words, playing a violent video game increased the aggressiveness of 
participants after they had been provoked by their opponent's noise blast."108 
Anderson and Dill conclude that the combination of correlational and 
laboratory results support the causal claim. "The convergence of findings 
across such disparate methods lends considerable strength to the main 
hypothesis that exposure to violent video games can increase aggressive 
behavior."lo9 They believe violent video games to be of more concern than 
violent television or films because of the identification with the game 
aggressor that players experience and the active participation in the virtual 
violence of the game. "In a sense, violent video games provide a complete 
learning environment for aggression, with simultaneous exposure to modeling, 
reinforcement, and rehearsal of behaviors. This combination of learning 
strategies has been shown to be more powerful than any ofthese methods used 
singly."llo 
One of the authors of the study just discussed has, with a different 
coauthor, more recently published a meta-analysis of the current, developing 
research on the effects of violent video games. I I I They identified thirty-five 
research reports, most of them experimental, laboratory studies, but including 
some field studies. Longitudinal studies were lacking, but that is unsurprising 
given the recent genesis of specific interest in violent video games. The meta-
analysis led the authors to conclude that "[v]iolent video games increased 
aggression in males and females, in children and adults, and in experimental 
and nonexperimental settings."112 The experimental studies showed that 
108. ld. 
109. ld. at 787. 
I 10. ld. at 788 (citations omitted). 
III. See Craig A. Anderson & Brad J. Bushman, Effects of Violent Video Games on 
Aggressive Behavior, Aggressive Cognition, Aggressive Affect, Psysiological Arousal, and 
Prosocial Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Scientific Literature, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 353 
(2001 ). 
112. ld. at 357. 
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"short-term exposure to violent video games causes at least a temporary 
increase in aggression," I 13 while the nonexperimental studies demonstrate that 
"exposure to violent video games is correlated with aggression in the real 
world.,,114 The study also showed that violent video games cause a decrease 
in prosocial behavior and are correlated to an unwillingness to help others in 
the real world, cause aggressive thoughts, and increase aggressive feelings. I IS 
There is a study that has caused one court to call the science on the effect 
of violent video games "somewhat equivocal. ,,116 The study cited, by 
Australian researchers Michele Fleming and Debra Rickwood,117 does not, 
however, really serve as a counterpoint to the studies already discussed. It is 
true that the study found no correlation between aggression and having played 
a violent video game, but the game employed in the study was of a far 
different nature than those in the other studies. The Australian study involved 
a population of eight to twelve year olds. The games compared the nonviolent 
game titled Bouncer II, which required moving about geometric figures, with 
what was considered a violent game. The violent game, Hero's Adventure, 
placed the player in the role of Hero, who travels through ancient Greece to 
rescue Persephone from Hades, and required the slaying of Cyclops monsters 
and skeletons. The study's authors suggest the possibility that the failure to 
find an aggressiveness inducing effect may result from the game not being 
seen as very violent. As they explain, "[f]or ethical reasons, a very 'mild' 
game was chosen.,,118 In fact, the game was rated "G8+" indicating that no 
parental guidance was suggested for children eight and older. 119 It is then 
perhaps not surprising that playing the game over a short period had no 
negative effect on children whose average age was ten years, six months. 120 
The authors suggest that the same result might not have been obtained had a 
more violent game been used. 121 
113. Id. (emphasis added). 
114. Id. (footnote omitted). 
115. See id. at 358. 
116. Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167, 182 n.33 (D. Conn. 2002). 
The comment comes in response to a claim that violent video games are addictive, but the two 
studies cited for the equivocal result regard the causation of aggressive behavior. 
117. See Michele J. Fleming & Debra J. Rickwood, Effects o/Violent Versus Nonviolent 
Video Games on Children 's Arousal. Aggressive Mood. and Positive Mood, 3 I J. ApPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 2047 (200 I). 
118. Id. at 2064. 
119. See id. at 2052. 
120. See id. at 2053. 
12\. See id. at 2065. 
HeinOnline -- 2003 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 76 2003
76 Law Review [Vol. 1:51 
C. The Training and Instructional Danger of Video Games 
In a more anecdotal vein, as opposed to a controlled study, is the 
nonetheless important work of Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, who 
formerly taught psychology at the United States Military Academy. He offers 
a chilling comparison of the video games played by children and the training 
and conditioning in the military. 122 Grossman examined studies of the actions 
of soldiers in combat and found a strong unwillingness to kill other human 
beings, an unwillingness that resulted in a firing rate in the neighborhood of 
only twenty percent in World War 11;123 that is, only a small minority of 
American riflemen were willing to fire their weapons at the enemy. That 
firing rate was similar to the firing rates for American troops in earlier wars. 
In response to the World War II experience, the military undertook steps to 
change training in order to increase the firing rate. The changes had their 
desired effect. By the Korean War, the firing rate increased to fifty-five 
percent, and with more refinement in training the rate increased to between 
ninety to ninety-five percent for the Vietnam War. 124 
Grossman and DeGaetano, the coauthor of one of Grossman's books, 
find three things necessary to shooting and killing: the potential killer must 
have a gun, the skill to hit the target, and the willingness to take another's 
life. 125 Armies have long supplied the first, and the recently developed 
training techniques provide the second and third. Earlier training by firing at 
bull's eye targets provided skill, at least as to the mechanics of accurately 
firing a weapon, but there may have been a lack of carry over to the real 
world. More recent use of pop-up figures of people provides a more realistic 
setting, requiring quick reaction and finding target zones on the human form. 
It is also a lesser jump from shooting at a human shaped target to a real person 
than it is from a bull' s eye to a real person. Still better training came with the 
advent of computer simulations. Military trainees using computers "learn how 
to shoot, where to shoot, how to maneuver through possibly deadly combat 
situations, how to tell enemy from friend, and, most important, how to kill. 
The entire event of killing in combat can be simulated by a computer."126 
122. See DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO 
KILL IN WAR AND SOCIETY (1995); GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 14. 
123. See GROSSMAN, supra note 122, at 250 ("In World War II, 75 to 80 percent of 
riflemen did not fire their weapons at an exposed enemy, even to save their lives and the lives 
of their friends."); GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 14, at 72 ("[T]he firing rate was a 
mere 15 percent among riflemen."). 
124. See GROSSMAN, supra note 122, at 251. 
125. See GROSSMAN & DEGAETANO, supra note 14, at 72-73. 
126. !d. at 72. 
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The relevance of the changes in military training is the similarity to the 
video games currently played by children. 127 For Grossman, the Paducah 
school killings show that video games provide children training in killing 
similar to that used in the military, but of course, without the discipline also 
learned in military training. It was Grossman and DeGaetano's description of 
Michael Carneal's actions that show the skill and suppression of natural 
impulses that went into the shootings and made them so deadly effective, and 
note that Carneal's training was limited to video game simulations. 128 
Video games not only appear to supply the skill necessary to be an 
efficient killer, they may also serve a role in overcoming the reluctance to kill. 
The military use of simulators not only generates skill in aiming a weapon; it 
helps develop a conditioned response in which the soldier fires, when faced 
by a particular set of circumstances. The response is reinforced by rewards 
for high scores, the dropping of the target, the award of marksmanship badges, 
and additional rewards ranging from praise to passes. 129 It is reasonable to 
believe that dropping targets and attaining high scores provide similar 
reinforcement for efficient performance by children on equivalent video 
games. 
Violent video games act against a background of other media violence 
providing the skills that may make deadly the aggressiveness that comes more 
generally from violent media. It would also seem that any desensitization 
regarding violence from the more passive media would be strengthened by the 
more active participation in the video game variety of media violence. Violent 
video games provide at least whatever causal effect on real world violence the 
other media provide and probably more through the active involvement in 
video game play. They have the further deadly effect of providing the skills 
to act on those aggressive impulses. 
D. Meeting Strict Scrutiny 
A properly drawn, narrowly framed statute l30 restricting access by 
children to violent video games should meet strict scrutiny. It is difficult to 
conceive of a governmental purpose more compelling than the protection of 
127. Grossman and DeGaetano say that the United States Army's simulator, 
Multipurpose Arcade Combat Simulator, is a modification of the Super Nintendo game Duck 
Hunt and that the Fire Arms Training Simulator used by many law enforcement agencies is 
"more or less identical" to the video game Time Crisis. Id. at 74. 
128. See supra note 15-20 and accompanying text. 
129. See GROSSMAN, supra note 122, at 254. 
130. The drawing of such a statute is addressed infra notes 293-95 and accompanying 
text. 
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the physical and psychological well being ofthe nation's youth. While courts 
have not seen the necessity of restricting access to violent passive media to 
further that interest, video games pose their own set of dangers that require 
restrictions on access by children. While Judge Posner may believe that video 
games have never caused anyone to commit a violent act or raised the level of 
violence anywhere,131 the United States Army would seem to disagree. Quite 
similar games, or simulators, have increased the willingness to commit what 
are violent, even if justified, acts by soldiers. It is implausible that providing 
the same training to children, especially without also providing the discipline 
taught in the armed forces, would not increase the likelihood of violence 
among the young. 
Judge Posner also failed to appreciate the differences in interactivity 
between video games and the passive media. While all literature, television, 
and film may strive to involve the audience, that is not the same as the 
audience members participating in the action and outcome of the presentation. 
The army did not reach the firing rates it did by showing its trainees 
Guadalcanal Diary or The Sands of fwo Jima; it was the interactivity of 
combat simulators that had the desired effect. The terrorist hijackers of the 
September 11 th attacks did not simply watch films or read books about flying, 
they spent time on simulators. Simulators provide instruction through 
feedback that the passive media cannot, no matter how hard they strive to 
involve the reader or viewer. In the military marksmanship or video game 
context, they also provide reward for performance, from medals to points, that 
strengthen response. Again, "violent video games provide a complete learning 
environment for aggression, with simultaneous exposure to modeling, 
reinforcement, and rehearsal of behaviors. This combination of learning 
strategies has been shown to be more powerful than any of these methods used 
singly."132 
n. VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY 
Consider a video arcade crammed full of machines with names like 
"Harem" and "Concubine." Twelve and thirteen year old boys, by making 
"the right moves" cause the images of attractive females to disrobe. 
131. See Am. Amusement Mach. II, 244 F.3d at 578-79. 
132. Anderson & Dill, supra note 100, at 788 (citing Edward J. Barton, Developing 
Sharing: A n Analysis of Modeling and Other Behavioral Techniques, 5 BEHA V. MODIFICATION 
386 (1981); John H. Chambers & Frank R. Ascione, The Effects of Prosocial and Aggressive 
Videogames on Children's Donating and Helping, 148 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 499 (1987); 
GEOFFREY R. LOFTUS & ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, MIND AT PLAY: ThE PSYCHOLOGY OF VIDEO 
GAMES (1983». 
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Depending on the players' skill level, the boys then engage in any number of 
virtual reality ultimate sexual acts with those electronic beauties. Society 
would certainly find such game room activities by children unacceptable, and 
the courts would not stand in the way of regulation. 133 Yet, every day 
teenagers engage in virtual ultimate violence, while the ability of society to 
prevent that sort of activity is questioned. The difference is that depictions of 
sexual content can be sufficiently explicit and offensive as to come within the 
obscenity exception to the protections offered by the First Amendment. 134 The 
Seventh Circuit opinion in Am. Amusement Mach. II refused to consider the 
possibility that depictions could be obscene due solely to violent content, and 
that court is not alone in its refusal. 135 The lower court in Am. Amusement 
Mach. I took a more expansive view of the obscenity exception, concluding 
that 
[i]t would be an odd conception of the First Amendment ... that would allow a state 
to prevent a boy from purchasing a magazine containing pictures of topless women 
in provocative poses ... but give that same boy a constitutional right to train to 
become a sniper at the local arcade without his parent's permission. 136 
It would be an odd conception but one that is commonly held. The modem 
application of the obscenity exception has focussed solely on sexual and 
excretory activities, but that focus is the product of Victorian Era concerns 
and is a relatively recent narrowing of a focus that was far greater in 
constitutionally relevant eras. Properly understood, the obscenity exception 
would be seen to extend to sufficiently explicit and offensive depictions of 
violence. The arguments are more fully presented elsewhere but I conclude 
that the ordinary language meaning of "obscene," the case law in 
133. Indeed, the video game industry has not even challenged such restriction. The 
Indianapolis ordinance, for example, provided restrictions not only on violent video game access 
but also on games with strong sexual content. The industry, however, was said by the lower 
court in American Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick to "have no quarrel with the 
Ordinance's restriction on children's access to games with 'strong sexual content. '" Am. 
Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945 (S.D. Ind. 2000) [hereinafter 
Am. Amusement Mach.I], rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001). 
134. The obscenity exception was recognized in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957). 
135. See, e.g., Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1997). The Supreme 
Court has never, however, directly ruled on the issue. In Winters v. New York, the Court did 
declare unconstitutional a statute preventing the sale of material "principally made up of 
criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of 
bloodshed, lust or crime," but it did so on vagueness grounds and warned against concluding 
that the state lacked all authority to regulate violent material. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 
507,508 (1948). 
136. Am. Amusement Mach. I, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 981. 
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constitutionally relevant periods, and the first amendment policy arguments 
that justifiy the obscenity exception all speak just as well to violence as to 
sex. 13? 
A. The Ordinary Language Concept 
As a term of ordinary language, "obscene" has a broader extension than 
both sex and violence, as in talk of a company making obscene profits. But 
even more rigorous examinations of the word, based on its derivation, would 
include violence with sex. The derivation of the word "obscene" has been 
argued to be either from "ob caenum," or "on account of filth" or simply 
"filth "138 or from "ab scaena" or "offthe stage" which could mean either "not , , 
to be openly shown on the stage of life"139 or instead "off the theatrical 
stage.,,140 Professor Harry Clor offers an analysis of the word "obscene" that 
speaks to both the idea of filth and the "off the stage of life" derivation. He 
suggests that obscene depictions are those that offer "a degradation of the 
human dimensions of life to a sub-human or merely physical level."141 
Further, obscene literature is, for Clor, that which "presents, graphically and 
in detail, a degrading picture of human life and invites the reader or viewer, 
not to contemplate that picture, but to wallow in it."142 Clor goes on to include 
the "off the stage of life" derivation, writing "obscenity consists in making 
public that which is private; it consists in an intrusion upon intimate physical 
processes and acts or physical-emotional states."143 The two are tied together 
in that "when the intimacies of life are exposed to public view their human 
value may be depreciated.,,144 
137. See SAUNDERS, supra note 57; Kevin W. Saunders, Media Violence and the 
Obscenity Exception to the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILLRTS. J. 107 (1994); Kevin 
W. Saunders, Media Self-Regulation of Depictions of Violence: A Last Opportunity, 47 OKLA. 
L. REV. 445 (1994). 
138. See, e.g., HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY: CENSORSHIP IN A 
LIBERAL SOCIETY 210 (1969); Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, 
Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.l. 1,7 (1985). 
139. CLOR, supra note 138, at 210 (footnote omitted). 
140. See, e.g., RICHARD H. KUH, FOOLISH FIG LEAVES? PORNOGRAPHY IN-AND OUT OF-
COURT 335-36 n.l (1967) (quoting Walter Allen, The Writer and the Frontiers of Tolerance, 
in "To DEPRAVE AND CORRUPT ... ": ORIGINAL STUDIES IN THE NATURE AND DEFINITION OF 
"OBSCENITY" 147 (John Chandos ed., 1962» ("Obscenity seems originally to have meant that 
which could not be represented upon the stage. It is related to ancient Greek theories of 
drama."). 
141. CLOR, supra note 138, at 225. 
142. [d. at 234. 
143. [d. at 225. 
144. /d. 
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Under this insightful approach, it is not the focus on sex that can make 
a depiction obscene; it is the treatment of human beings in a purely physical 
way with regard to acts or activities that also have great emotional or spiritual 
importance. "The element of obscenity ... consists in one's being 'too close' 
to other persons performing intimate physical acts."145 We withhold from 
view acts and events that have both spiritual and physical sides but for which 
an observer can experience only the physical, subhuman aspects of the act. 146 
This approach explains the private nature of sex and excretory activities, but 
it also would include other physical drives or inevitiablities, anything that 
focuses solely on the physical side of human existence. 147 A romantic film has 
a focus on the human spirit that should, under Clor's approach, be 
nonobscene, even with explicit sex, as long as the physical acts are in a 
context that provides human, as opposed to solely animal, meaning. The same 
would, under this analysis, carry over to violence. A death scene that 
considers human values concerning life and death and relationships to those 
close to the departed does not have a sole focus on the physical that is present 
in the slasher film, and sufficient violence for its own sake should be 
considered as obscene as explicit sexual depictions for their own sake. In fact, 
Clor reaches this conclusion himself, writing that an obscene depiction is "one 
which tends predominantly to ... [v]isually portray in detail, or graphically 
describe in lurid detail, the violent physical destruction, torture, or 
dismemberment of a human being, provided this is done to exploit morbid or 
shameful interest in these matters and not for genuine scientific, educational, 
or artistic purposes.,,148 He also includes as obscene similarly lurid depictions 
or descriptions of death or of dead bodies. 149 
The "off the [theatrical] stage" derivation of "obscene" has the 
advantage of tying the concept to its area of application; that is, since the 
ascription is used to indicate that which can be banned from the entertainment 
145. Id. 
146. See id. at 226. 
There are certain bodily acts which will tend to arouse disgust in an observer who is 
not involved in the act and is not, at the time, subject to its urgencies. What the 
observer sees is a human being governed by physiological urges and functions. Now, 
to the participants, the act ... can have important personal and supra-biological 
meanings. But the outside observer cannot share the experience of these meanings; 
what he sees is simply the biological process. 
CLOR, supra note 138, at 226. 
147. See id. at 225. C"[T]here can ... be obscene views of death, of birth, of illness, and 
of acts such as that of eating .... Obscenity makes a public exhibition of these phenomena and 
does so in such a way that their larger human context is lost or depreciated."). 
148. Id. at 245. 
149. See id. 
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media, what has historically been banned in that arena should cast light on 
what is included within the concept. The history of what has been considered 
obscene in that regard clearly shows that in different eras violence has been 
banned from the stage. In those eras it was ab scaena, or off stage, and in 
some of those eras sex was not as restricted. Greek drama was quite tolerant 
of sexual themes in comedies but intolerant of violence. The sexual content 
does not match that of modem "adult films," but it does not require ajoumey 
too far into our society's past to find an era in which Aristophanes would have 
been shocking. Aristophanes' The Clouds and Lysistrata both have sexual 
content, 150 again not to the point of modem film, but Lysistrata was subject to 
customs seizure during the first thirty years of this century and, as late as 
1955, was considered obscene by the Post Office: 5 I 
The Greek treatment of violence was more restrictive. Descriptions of 
violence and even some audience exposure were allowed. In Sophocles' 
Electra, Clytemnestra is killed by her son in a house out of the view of the 
audience, but her voice is heard. 152 In Euripides' Hecuba, Polymestor's sons 
are killed and Polymestor is blinded in a tent set up on stage, to the 
accompaniment of screams and battering on the walls of the tent. 153 What 
Greek drama did not allow was the visual depiction of violent death. "When 
the plot of [a] play ... required such an incident, the harrowing details were 
narrated by a messenger who had witnessed the event."154 "We are led up to 
the point where some violent deed is going to take place, given the motives for 
the deed and the story behind it, but the deed itself takes place off stage. "155 
Roman theater, at least later Roman theater, certainly allowed a great 
deal of violence. A society in which mortal combat is a form of entertainment 
does not share the Greek aversion to violence on the stage. It is claimed that 
in the performance of a play, a slave was forced to play the role of a person 
killed by wild beasts and was actually killed by a bear on stage. 156 While 
violence was explicit and real, so were sexual performances in that same late 
150. See FOUR PLAYS BY ARISTOPHANES (William Arrowsmith et al. trans., First 
Meridian Classic Printing 1984). 
151. See H. MONTGOMERY HYDE, A HISTORY OF PORNOGRAPHY 40 (1964) (citing JAMES 
C. N. PAUL & MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN THE MAIL 104 
(1961 )). 
152. See THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF SOPHOCLES (Sir Richard Claverhouse Jebb trans., 
Moses Hadas ed., 1967). 
153. See EURIPIDES III (David Grene & Richmond Lattimore eds., 1958). 
154. RoYC. FLICKINGER, THE GREEK THEATER AND ITS DRAMA 127-28 (4th ed. 1936). 
155. PETER D. ARNOTT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE GREEK THEATRE 22 (1959). 
156. See RICHARD C. BEACHAM, THE ROMAN THEATRE AND [TS AUDIENCE 136 (1991) 
(The play was Catullus' Laurealus.). 
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Roman theater. 157 It was not the case that the focus of obscenity had shifted 
from violence to sex; it had simply lost focus. 
Medieval drama also appears not to have been so averse to violence. In 
religious plays portraying the lives ofthe martyrs violence seemed common. 158 
It is also the case that the classics of English drama contained violence. Many 
of Shakespeare's plays were set against a background of violence. Despite the 
existence of violence, it is important to note that Shakespeare's plays were not 
as violent as they could have been and that some violence occurs off the stage. 
In Titus Andronicus, a play considered Shakespeare's grisliest, 159 the worst of 
the violence is behind the scenes. Lavinia is raped, and her hands are cut off 
and her tongue cut out. The violence against her is described and she appears 
on stage with bleeding mouth and bloody stumps where her hands were, but 
Shakespeare chose not to show the violence. 
While there may have been a tolerance for violence in the era, in some 
regions there also seems to have been a tolerance for sexual displays. Human 
intercourse served to entertain select audiences in France from the 
Renaissance through part of the 18th century, and copulating animals were a 
common exhibition in the same era in a number of European societies. 160 
What should be clear is that "obscene" as "off the theatrical stage" has not, 
historically, had sole application to sexual or excretory activities. The 
treatments of violence and sex differ from era to era, and neither can claim the 
sole right to the ascription "obscene." Thus, under any of the derivations and 
ordinary language analyses of the word or concept, obscenity encompasses 
violence as well as it does sex. 
B. Legal History 
When the Supreme Court recognized the obscenity exception in Roth v. 
United States, 161 it did so, at least in part, on the basis of a legal history that 
indicated obscene material was never seen as protected by the First 
Amendment. The Court recognized restrictions on speech in the colonial era 
and indications that, at the time of the First Amendment, obscenity was among 
157. See id. at 137. 
158. See John Spalding Gatton, • There Must Be Blood ': Mutilation and Martyrdom on 
the Medieval Stage, in VIOLENCE IN DRAMA 79 (James Redmond ed., 1991). 
159. For a description of the play and an analysis of the violence see Jonas Barish, 
Shakespearean Violence: A Preliminary Survey, in VIOLENCE IN DRAMA 101 (James Redmond 
ed.,1991). 
160. See EBERHARD KRONHAUSEN & PHYLLIS KRONHAUSEN, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE 
LA W: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EROTIC REALISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 66-67 (1964). 
161. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
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the forms that were restricted. 162 What the Court failed to note is that the 
statutes cited, while they did prohibit obscenity, failed to define what was 
obscene. 
Professor Schauer notes a lack of definition for obscenity in English law 
until 1868.163 In American law a focus on sex appeared to be developing in 
the mid to late 1800s, but Schauer finds it finally clear only with the 1896 
decision in Swearingen v. United States l64 that obscenity focused solely on 
sexually oriented material. That focus on sex then developed only in a 
constitutionally irrelevant era as a part of the Victorian Era preoccupation 
with sexual regulation. Such an 1896 definition should not be mistaken for 
a definition in the era of the Bill of Rights, and if laws banning the obscene 
in that era or shortly thereafter serve to justify the existence of the exception, 
it is not a later legal definition that sets the scope of that unprotected material 
but an earlier, broader concept that goes beyond sex. 
The inclusion of violence within that concept is indicated by the states' 
reactions to the developing focus of obscenity on sex. When the use of the 
word "obscene" became limited to sexual material, the states stepped in to 
pass statutes regulating violence. What might have been restricted as obscene 
before now needed its own statute. Indeed, the New York group established 
by the anti-obscenity crusader Anthony Comstock also led the effort to 
establish a New York statute prohibiting the distribution of "any book, 
pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the 
publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or 
accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust 
or crime."165 Although the statute was held to be unconstitutionally vague in 
Winters v. New York,166 it does reflect a concern shared by a majority of the 
states in existence in the late 1800s and early 1900s, as shown by nineteen 
nearly identical and four substantially similar statutes. 167 Some of those 
statutes continued to use the word "obscene" in their titles; 168 they may be 
viewed as insisting that the category of the obscene is not so limited. Other 
states, by enacting statutes addressed to material no longer covered by 
obscenity statutes and not insisting on maintaining the label, may be seen as 
wishing to continue to ban such material without being concerned over the 
label to be applied. 
162. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957). 
163. See FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 7 (1976). 
164. 161 U.S. 446 (1896). 
165. Winters, 333 U.S. at 508 (citations omitted). 
166. 333 U.S. 507 (1948). 
167. See Winters, 333 U.S. at 522-23 (Frankfurter, 1., dissenting). 
168. The statutes are discussed in SAUNDERS, supra note 57, at 114-19. 
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The history that was said to justify the obscenity exception then justifies 
an exception that encompasses violence rather than one limited to sex. The 
law in the Constitutional era and the era ofthe Bill of Rights denied protection 
to obscenity, but obscenity had not acquired a narrow focus on sex. The era 
in which that focus developed is a constitutionally irrelevant time, and the fact 
that the states continued to suppress violent material, some even continuing 
to call it obscene, provides as long a history of addressing concerns of violent 
depiction as that for addressing sex. 
C. Policy Bases 
In addition to the historical bases for banning the obscene, the Roth 
Court and various commentators have presented policy reasons for denying 
first amendment protection to obscene materials. The policy analysis has been 
limited to 'the consideration of depictions of sexual activity, but the policy 
reasons carry over with equal weight to obscene violence. Only two such 
justifications are examined here, at opposite extremes of first amendment 
protectiveness, while still justifying the obscenity exception, but an 
examination of other justifications yields similar results. 169 
Roth took the position that the First Amendment was intended to assure 
the free interchange of ideas to bring about "political and social changes 
desired by the people."I7O This rationale is similar to what Professor Blasi 
called the First Amendment's "checking value," the role that "free speech, a 
free press, and free assembly can serve in checking the abuse of power by 
public officials."171 It also reflects Professor Meiklejohn's theory that for 
speech to enjoy first amendment protection it should relate to self-
governance. 172 
The "checking value" or self-governance view of the scope of first 
amendment protection would deny such protection to sexual obscenity. While 
pornography may be used as a medium for political expression, pornography 
is only obscene, under the rule in Miller v, California,173 if it "lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."174 If obscene, it is not seriously 
political pornography. The important point here is that, just as sexual 
169. See id. at 135-60. 
170. Roth, 354 U,S. at 484. 
171. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977). 
172. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948). 
173. 413 U.S. 15 (1973), 
174. Millerv.Califomia,413 U.S, 15,24(1973). 
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obscenity lacks protection under the "checking value" or self-governance 
theories, so also does violent obscenity, if properly defined. If the Miller 
definition of obscenity is adapted to allow a ban on explicit depictions of 
violence only when such depictions lack "serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value," then any work considered violent obscenity would by 
definition not have serious political value. 175 So, just as sexually obscene 
works without serious political value are unprotected under the "checking 
value" model of the First Amendment, violently obscene works should be 
unprotected. 
If the values found so central by Blasi and Meiklejohn provided the 
limits of first amendment protections, that would be the end of the argument. 
However, while the values they and the Roth opinion identify are certainly 
important and may be viewed as core values, the Amendment does protect 
other expression. Literature, art, and entertainment are also protected, so 
other justifications for the exception must be considered. 
Professor Schauer justifies the exception, despite a broad view of first 
amendment protection, by arguing that sexual obscenity departs completely 
from the sphere of protected speech and is in fact nonspeech. He discusses 
what he admits is a hypothetical extreme example of hard core pornography. 
The hypothetical ten-minute film is nothing but a close up of sexual organs 
engaged in intercourse, with no dialogue, no music, and no attempt at artistic 
depiction. Schauer argues that: 
[A]ny definition of 'speech' ... that included this film ... is being bizarrely literal 
or fonnalistic. Here the vendor is selling a product for the purpose of inducing 
immediate sexual stimulation. There are virtually no differences in intent and effect 
from the sale of a plastic or vibrating sex aid, the sale of a body through prostitution, 
or the sex act itself. At its most extreme, hard core pornography is a sex aid, no more 
and no less, and the fact that there is no physical contact is only fortuitous. 176 
If pornography is simply a sex aid, it deserves, in Schauer's view, no 
protection and should be treated similarly to any physical device designed to 
stimulate. The fact that the stimulating experience is initiated visually, rather 
than by tactile means, is irrelevant. It does not really involve communication. 
There is, of course, a mental element to pornography-caused sexual 
arousal. The visual images must be processed by the brain before any effect 
can result. While a physical stimulator does not require any higher level 
mental infonnation processing for its effects, the mental element to 
pornography based arousal is not sufficiently distinguishing. The objection 
to including sexually obscene materials within even this broad view of the 
175. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
176. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 181 (1982) 
(footnote omitted). 
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protections of freedom of speech appears to be that the brain is not its final 
audience or even a co-equal audience. While music, art, and romantic 
literature may stimulate, they also communicate other messages aimed at the 
intellect. The brain is at least a co-equal audience. The position that an 
intellectual experience is more protected than a visceral response seems 
reasonable. It also seems reasonable, however, to treat visceral responses 
involving the adrenal glands in the same way as visceral responses involving 
the genitals. If material is violent enough to have a hormonal effect, even 
Schauer's broad view would not reach such material and should not provide 
first amendment protection. 
There are, of course, first amendment theories that speak against the 
existence of a sexual obscenity exception and would also speak against an 
exception for violent obscenity. J77 Nonetheless, the obscenity exception is a 
part of the law. As long as it is a part of the law, the interesting theories are 
those that justify it. There appear to be no such theories that would not also 
justify an exception for violent obscenity. Given the history, both in drama 
and law, the ordinary language uses of the term, and the inability to 
distinguish the two under first amendment theory, the law should allow a 
refocusing of the obscenity exception to include violence. 
D. Children and Variable Obscenity 
The district court opinion in Am. Amusement Mach. I recognized the 
effect that depictions of violence can potentially be obscene has on limiting 
youth access to violent video games. The first sentence ofthe opinion reads: 
"The First Amendment does not prohibit states from restricting children's 
access to pornography even though adults' access to the same sexually explicit 
materials may not be restricted."178 The materials at issue in Am. Amusement 
Mach. I were not sexually explicit and thus not pornographic, but the court 
saw a parallel in the treatment of pornography that carried over to the games 
that were of concern to Indianapolis. The court relied strongly on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Ginsberg v. New York,179 which recognized the 
distinction present in the language quoted. Ginsberg invoked the doctrine of 
variable obscenity to uphold a conviction for selling what it characterized as 
"girlie magazines" to a minor. While the magazines would not be obscene 
177. The work of Professor Edwin Baker, based on free speech as a part of autonomy, 
provides an example. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
(1989). 
178. Am. Amusement Mach. I, liS F. Supp. 2d at 945 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 
U.S. 629 (1968)). 
179. 390 U.s. 629 (1968). 
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when sold to adults, the Court said that the audience can be taken into 
account. The prurient interests ofthe teenage male being more easily piqued, 
provocatively posed nudes may be obscene for that' audience, even if 
insufficiently offensive and explicit to be obscene for adults. New York's 
restriction on distributing material to minors that is "harmful to minors," 
which the statute defined as material that "(i) predominantly appeals to the 
prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and (ii) is patently offensive 
to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what 
is suitable material for minors, and (iii) is utterly without redeeming social 
importance for minors," 180 was held constitutional. 
Earlier courts had been faced with the argument that Ginsberg allowed 
the state to limit the access of children to violent materials but had rejected the 
claim. The Eight Circuit, in Video Software Dealers Ass 'n v. Webster, 181 
struck down a Missouri statute that banned the rental or sale to minors of 
violent videos. The court rejected the state's reliance on Ginsberg, because 
Ginsberg applied not to violence but only to material that is obscene as to 
minors. The Supreme Court of Tennessee reached the same conclusion 
regarding a similar statute in that state. 182 Reaching a different ultimate 
conclusion regarding the applicability of Ginsberg to a violent video game 
statute and finding it constitutional on that basis requires the recognition that 
depictions of violence are potentially obscene. Only then can the doctrine of 
variable obscenity be employed to conclude that violent material that would 
be acceptable for adults may be restricted when the consumer is a minor. 
E. Obscenity and Offence 
Judge Posner, in the Seventh Circuit Am. Amusement Mach. II opinion, 
addressed and rejected the application of Ginsberg, concluding that 
"[v]iolence and obscenity are distinct categories of objectionable 
depiction."183 The difference between the two, as Judge Posner saw it, is that 
the violent video game statute at issue was motivated by concerns over the 
violence inducing effects the government saw in such activities, while "[t]he 
main worry about obscenity, the main reason for its proscription, is ... that 
180. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,633 (1968) (citations omitted). 
181. 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992). 
182. See Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S. W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1993). 
183. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir.) 
[hereinafter Am. Amusement Mach.ll], cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001) (citing Winters, 333 
U.S. at 518-20; United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
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it is offensive."184 He did allow that it is imaginable that an ordinance could 
be directed at depictions of violence because of offensiveness but said that 
was not the basis of Indianapolis' ordinance and that the games introduced 
into evidence were themselves not offensive. 185 
It is unclear why the government must be motivated by offensiveness. 
If a city had not had an ordinance like that in Ginsberg limiting the access of 
minors to sexually provocative materials not obscene for adult audiences, but 
came to believe that such materials were contributing to teenage pregnancies, 
it would seem that Ginsberg would support a properly drawn ordinance even 
so motivated. Indeed, if a state did not have an obscenity statute and chose to 
adopt one out of a concern that the presence of such materials has a negative 
effect on marriage, Roth would still seem to support such a law, as long as it 
met the test of Miller. If material is obscene, or obscene as to minors and 
distributed to that audience, it is unprotected by the First Amendment, and 
whatever rational motive the state may have will justify the limitation. 
It is true that under Miller, to be found obscene a work must be patently 
offensive, and any extension to violence would require a similar finding of 
offensiveness, 186 but the Indianapolis ordinance did so require. The ordinance 
limited minor access only to those games that are "patently offensive to 
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what 
is suitable material for persons under the age of eighteen. "187 This is a precise 
parallel to the language in the New York statute upheld by the Supreme Court 
in Ginsberg with only "persons under eighteen" substituted for the New York 
statutes use of "minors." I 88 
184. Am. Amusement Mach. /I, 244 F.3d at 574. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit also recently made this same point, citing the Seventh Circuit's Am. 
Amusement Mach. /I opinion. See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 
2002), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 123 S. Ct. 967 (2003). The Sixth Circuit's consideration 
arose in the context of a tort case brought by the parents of victims of the Paducah shootings 
against media defendants said to have influenced Michael Carneal, the shooter. See James, 300 
F.3d at 686. The tort setting adds to the difficulties of applying obscenity theory. See id. at 696. 
The major additional issue is the lack of a statute clearly setting out the sort of depictions that 
may be considered obscene and the chilling effect that would have on the media. The Sixth 
Circuit pointed to that issue, but it is also clear that the court declined to extend the invitation 
to extend obscenity law in this direction. See id. at 697. 
185. See Am. Amusement Mach. /1,244 F.3d at 575. 
186. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. 
187. Am. Amusement Mach. I, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 946 (citations omitted). 
188. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633. The statute in Ginsberg was addressed to 
distribution to those under seventeen, rather than eighteen as in the Indianapolis ordinance. See 
id. That raises a separate issue to be discussed infra notes 283-86 and accompanying text, but 
does not affect the issue of offensiveness. 
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Judge Posner does seem to allow that some depictions of violence could 
be considered offensive, perhaps even to the point of being obscene. 189 
One can imagine an ordinance directed at depictions of violence because they, too, 
were offensive. Maybe violent photographs of a person being drawn and quartered 
could be suppressed as disgusting, embarrassing, degrading, or disturbing without 
proof that they were likely to cause any of the viewers to commit a violent act. They 
might even be described as "obscene," in the same way that photographs of people 
defecating might be, and in many obscenity statutes are, included within the legal 
category of the obscene. 190 
He goes on to state, however, that the only games in the record are not so 
sufficiently disgusting. 
The most violent game in the record, "The House ofthe Dead," depicts zombies being 
killed flamboyantly, with much severing of limbs and effusion of blood; but so 
stylized and patently fictitious is the cartoon-like depiction that no one would suppose 
it "obscene" in the sense in which a photograph ofa person being decapitated might 
be described as "obscene.,,191 
Despite the cartoon, and thus obviously fictitious nature of the action, it is not 
clear why the depictions cannot be obscene, if Judge Posner is truly willing 
to allow depictions of violence to fall within the category. 
It must be remembered that the restrictions apply to children, and the 
measure of obscenity is different where that is the audience. If the game 
involved stylized and patently fictitious zombies engaged in sex as explicit as 
the violence he describes, it would most likely not be found obscene for an 
adult audience but might well be for an audience of children. A similar 
comparison could be drawn for defecating zombies. Furthermore, it is not 
whether an adult judge or any other adult finds the images offensive for 
personal viewing. It is, as the statute upheld for sexual material in Ginsberg 
said, whether the material "is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the 
adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for 
minors.,,'92 
Even though Judge Posner seemed to leave open the possibility that 
violence could be sufficiently offensive as to be obscene, his distinction 
between obscenity as offensive and violence as of concern only because of the 
harm that it is seen, by someone other than Judge Posner, to cause seems to 
indicate a belief in the unlikelihood of the public finding such offense. 193 If 
that is what is behind the opinion, the conclusion may simply be wrong. A 
189. See, e.g., Am. Amusement Mach. II, 244 F.3d at 575. 
190. !d. (citations omitted). 
191. [d. 
192. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 633 (citations omitted). 
193. See Am. Amusement Mach. II, 244 F.3d at 574-75. 
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team of media researchers led by Professors Daniel Linz and Edward 
Donnerstein conducted a study that speaks rather directly to the issue. 194 Their 
study involved exposing a population in the Memphis, Tennessee area to 
sexual and violent films and surveying their reactions. 19s The sexual films 
were selected based on obscenity prosecutions indicating prosecutor beliefs 
that the films violated community standards for offensiveness. 196 The violent 
films were of the "slasher" variety. \97 The participants were asked to assess 
the films in terms of whether they found the films acceptable and also whether 
they thought their communities found them acceptable. 198 Summarizing their 
results, the scientists concluded that the adults found the sexual films not to 
be patently offensive, while the violent films were seen as exceeding their 
standards for offensiveness. 199 "The majority of our sample of community 
members ... appeared not to personally accept violent slasher films. ,,200 What 
is particularly interesting is that 
despite a lack of personal acceptance for violence among the majority of 
participants ... , a large majority both before and after viewing the [violent] material 
did indicate that others in the community tolerated these materials. This finding is 
interesting in light of our previous work on community members in Charlotte, NC, 
which showed that these citizens personally accepted sexua\1y explicit depictions but 
judged others in the community to be intolerant ofthem.201 
If those results accurately represent the population, then the participants must 
be wrong. Respondents do not tolerate violence but think that their 
community does, but they are the community (or are representative of it), so 
the real situation is that the community in a sense does not tolerate violence 
but thinks that it does. That is, the average person finds the material offensive 
but believes himself or herself to be out of step with public sentiment. To the 
contrary with sexual material; the average person does not take offense but 
believes that other members of the community are offended. Judge Posner, 
194. See generally Daniel Linz et aI., Discrepancies Between the Legal Code and 
Community Standards for Sex and Violence: An Empirical Challenge to Traditional 
Assumptions in Obscenity Law, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 127 (1995) [hereinafter Linz et aI., 
Discrepancies Between the Legal Code and Community Standards]. 
195. See id. at 137. 
196. See id. at 136. 
197. See id. at 139. 
198. Seeid.atl41. 
199. See id. at 155-56. 
200. Linz et aI., Discrepancies Between the Legal Code and Community Standards, 
supra note 194, at 157. 
20 I. [d. at 158-59 (footnote omitted) (citing Daniel Linz et aI., Estimating Community 
Standards: The Use of Social Science Evidence in an Obscenity Prosecution, 55 PUB. OPINION 
Q. 80 (\991». 
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whether he does or does not personally find violent depictions offensive, may 
have failed to recognize the degree to which the public does find such images 
offensive. 
Judge Posner raises one additional argument against applying an 
obscenity approach to the exposure of children to depictions of violence.202 
It speaks to what he sees as a historical acceptance of violence as fare for 
children and would, thus, also reinforce his argument that such depictions are 
not seen as offensive, even with regard to what is suitable for children.203 He 
writes: "Violence has always been and remains a central interest of 
humankind and a recurrent, even obsessive theme of culture both high and 
low. It engages the interest of children from an early age, as anyone familiar 
with the classic fairy tales collected by Grimm, Andersen, and Perrault is 
aware. ,,204 But of course, all but the last clause of the quote would read just 
as well and be just as true with "sex" substituted for "violence" without it 
serving to strike down limitations on the exposure of children to sexual 
images. With regard to that last clause, the comparison of Hansel and Gretel's 
encounter with a witch is as far from the modem slasher film as Prince 
Charming kissing Sleeping Beauty is from X-rated films. 205 
Fairy tales do contain a great deal of violence, but much of the violence 
is in a clear fantasy realm. Hansel and Gretel do trick a witch into an oven 
intended for them, but it is a witch and the action occurs in a place where 
houses are made of bread.206 Furthermore, even the Grimms Brothers' 
versions are toned down. Their Little Red Riding Hood is rescued from the 
stomach of the wolf, while in earlier versions she was not so fortunate.207 But, 
even there, it was a wolf capable of speech and impersonating a grandmother. 
While other instances of violence may not be set in quite so obvious a fantasy 
world, 
[i]n the Grimms' collection, the true horror stories are not so much tales based 
on the victimization/retaliation model as cautionary tales-texts that rely on a 
transgression/punishment model for their plotting. These stories end with the triumph 
of adult wisdom over childish disobedience, curiosity, or naughtiness. 
202. See Am. Amusement Mach. 11,244 F.3d at 577. 
203. See id. 
204. [d. at 577. 
205. It appears that the earlier tale out of which Sleeping Beauty came was closer to X-
rated. In an early Italian version, Prince Not-So-Charming is a married king who comes upon 
Sleeping Beauty, rapes her, and leaves her pregnant. See MARIA TATAR, THE HARD FACTS OF 
THE GRIMMS' FAIRY TALES 139 (1987) [hereinafter TATAR, THE HARD FACTS]' 
206. See MARIA TATAR, OFF WITH THEIR HEADS! FAIRY TALES AND THE CULTURE OF 
CHILDHOOD 208-09 (1992). 
207. See id. at 7-8. Little Red Riding Hood was also toned down in sexuality. See id. 
at 3. Earlier versions had her escape after performing a striptease for the wolf. See id. 
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[Tales with particularly strong punishment of children] seem consciously 
designed to impart specific lessons framed by adults for children. As cautionary tales, 
they demonstrate how children with undesirable traits-deceitfulness, curiosity, 
insolence-come to a bad end.2os 
93 
They are then morality plays for children, not simply early slasher stories. 
There is one additional point here. While the Grimms Brothers', and 
even more so Perrault's, versions of the fairy tales were rather violent, there 
is not as much violence in the film versions provided by film makers such as 
Disney.209 That is an important point. Given the impact of film on the sort of 
visceral response that seems the hallmark of obscenity, the existence of 
violence in the oral tradition of fairy tales, especially coupled with criticism 
of even that genre's suitability for children,2IO may not provide the 
justification Judge Posner sees for the far more realistic and visually explicit 
violence of many films and video games. 
m. VIDEO GAMES AS UNPROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
A. Early Video Games 
When Judge Limbaugh concluded in the St. Louis case that video games 
do not enjoy the protections of the First Amendment, he was not striking out 
on completely new ground.211 The idea that video games would enjoy no first 
amendment protection may seem odd, but there is the foundation for such a 
position in case law. The line is not long, since video games are a relatively 
recent development. The first in the line is America 's Best Family Showplace 
Corp. v. City of New York,212 a 1982 case in a New York federal district court. 
A restaurant operator in the Borough of Queens wanted to install coin 
operated video games in forty dining tables, and the Borough rejected the plan 
under an ordinance limiting video games in businesses such as restaurants, gift 
208. TATAR, THE HARD FACTS, supra note 205, at 191-92. 
209. See id. at 239 n.28 (noting that Disney lessened the emphasis on the evil queen by 
concentrating on the dwarves, who had not even been named in the Grimms' version). While 
there are certainly evil characters in film versions, the evil queen or step-mother remaining in 
those versions, the treatment of victims does not approach the barbarity of hacking people to 
pieces or children literally butchering each other. Id. at 3-5, 181. 
210. See, e.g., id. at 185 (noting that Grimms' fairy tales have come under "heavy fire" 
from educators). 
211. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 
1134-35,1141 (E.D. Mo. 2002). 
212. 536 F. Supp. 170 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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shops, and record stores to no more than four. 213 The restauranteur brought 
suit claiming that the restriction was a violation of his first amendment 
rights.214 
The court saw the dispositive question as whether or not video games are 
expression enjoying first amendment protection.21S The plaintiff argued that 
video games bring "visual and aural presentations on a screen involving a 
fantasy experience in which the player participates" and are sufficiently akin 
to a motion picture to enjoy the protection of the Amendment.216 Support was 
drawn from a Supreme Court case holding that a coin operated device 
permitting a customer to view live, nude dancing behind a glass panel was 
entertainment protected by the Constitution.217 The court, however, was 
unconvinced, responding that while the Supreme Court has protected nude 
dancing, "it seems clear that before entertainment is accorded First 
Amendment protection there must be some element of information or some 
idea being communicated. That element is clearly lacking here.,,218 Motion 
pictures, while entertainment, are protected because they may be used to 
convey ideas and affect public opinion, and trying to draw a line between 
entertaining and informing in such a medium is "too elusive for the protection 
of that basic right.,,219 Turning to the issue at hand, the court said: "In no 
sense can it be said that video games are meant to inform. Rather, a video 
game, like a pinball game, a game of chess, or a game of baseball, is pure 
entertainment with no informational element."22o Thus, no line between 
entertaining and informing had to be drawn, and video games could be denied 
the protection of the First Amendment and the limit offour games upheld.221 
Several other courts followed the lead of the America's Best court. In 
the 1983 case Caswell v. Licensing Commission,222 the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court considered a similar free expression claim in the review of the 
2\3. See America's Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 
170,171 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
214. See America's Best, 536 F. Supp. at 171. 
215. See id. at 173. 
216. Id. (citations omitted). 
217. See id. The plaintiff cited to Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 
(1981). 
218. America's Best, 536 F. Supp. at 173 (citations omitted). 
219. Id. at 174 (quoting Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948». 
220. Id. at 174. The court claimed support from Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, but 
that case examined copyright issues involving video games rather than First Amendment 
protections. See Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 857 (2d Cir. 1982). 
221. See America's Best, 536 F. Supp. at 174. 
222. 444 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. 1983). 
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denial ofa license for video games in a proposed arcade.223 The court again 
said that such protection attaches only to the communication or expression of 
some idea or information.224 The court noted cases regarding roller skating 
and recreational dancing that found no first amendment protection in such 
activities because they were not meant to communicate to or entertain an 
audience; they were not performances but were instead physical exercises and 
activities engaged in for the attainment of personal pleasure.22S As the court 
said, 
[o]n the record before us ... we conclude that [plaintiff] has not satisfied his burden 
of demonstrating that video games are or contain protected expression .... [H]e has 
failed to demonstrate that video games import sufficient communicative, expressive 
or informative elements to constitute expression protected under the First Amendment 
.... [I]t appears that any communication or expression of ideas that occurs during the 
playing of a video game is purely inconsequential. [Plaintiff] has succeeded in 
establishing only that video games are more technologically advanced games than 
pinball or chess. That technological advancement alone, however, does not impart 
First Amendment status to what is an otherwise unprotected game.226 
Two other Massachusetts cases in the same year also examined the first 
amendment status of video games. Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Town 
of Marshfiel~27 was also heard by the Massachusetts Supreme Court. It grew 
out of a complete prohibition by the town of Marshfield on the commercial 
operation of coin-activated amusement machines.228 Faced with the holding 
in Caswell, the Marshfield plaintiffs attempted to show that the video games 
they intended to make available to their customers, Ms. Pac-Man, Tron, 
Donkey Kong, Zaxxon, and Kangaroo, were sufficiently expressive as to merit 
protection.229 The court was unimpressed, but did recognize the potential that 
some future games might be protected: "We recognize that in the future video 
games which contain sufficient communicative and expressive elements may 
be created. We are not prepared in this case, however, to hold that these video 
games, which are, in essence, only technologically advanced pinball machines, 
are entitled to constitutional protection.'>23O 
223. See Caswell v. Licensing Comm'n, 444 N.E.2d 922, 922-23 (Mass. 1983). 
224. See Caswell, 444 N.E.2d at 925. 
225. See id. at 925-26. 
226. /d. at 926-27. 
227. 450 N.E.2d 605 (Mass. 1983). 
228. See Marshfield FamilySkateland, Inc. v. Town of Marshfield, 450 N.E.2d 605, 606-
07 (Mass. 1983). 
229. See Marshfield Family Skateland, 450 N.E.2d at 609. 
230. Id. at 609-10. 
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The third Massachusetts case was brought in federal court but to no 
greater success. Malden Amusement Co. v. CityofMalden231 again challenged 
the denial of a license, this time to operate fifty machines in an arcade. Again, 
the plaintiff claimed the protection of the First Amendment for his venture, 
and again the court refused to bring video games under the umbrella of the 
Free Expression Clauses.232 The court noted the decision and reasoning of the 
federal court in America's Best, found that reasoning persuasive, and adopted 
the conclusion of that court.233 
Similar reasoning has been used to uphold regulations prohibiting 
games, including video games, from establishments within two hundred feet 
of an elementary or secondary school234 and, most interestingly in People v. 
Walker,23S affirming a conviction for allowing juveniles to play video games, 
in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting any youth under seventeen from 
"any public association or involvement with electronic video games without 
his parent or guardian being present. ,,236 The Walker court specifically 
adopted the analysis ofthe Marshfield court, and like that court recognized the 
contingent nature ofthe conclusion and the possibility that future video games 
might be sufficiently expressive or communicative to merit protection.237 If 
a general prohibition on those under seventeen playing video games is 
constitutional, a prohibition on those same youths playing first person shooter 
video games should also be constitutional. 
There is a gap in the case law, until the 1991 case Rothner v. City of 
Chicago,238 which deserves particular mention, because of the judges 
231. 582 F. Supp. 297 (D. Mass. 1983). 
232. See Malden Amusement Co. v. City of Malden, 582 F. Supp. 297, 299 (D. Mass. 
1983). 
233. See Malden Amusement, 582 F. Supp. at 299. 
234. See, e.g., Tommy & Tina, Inc. v. Dep't of Consumer Affairs, 459 N. Y.S.2d 220 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct.), afFd, 464 N.Y.S.2d 132 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983), afFd, 464 N.E.2d 988 (N.Y. 
1984). 
235. 135 Mich. App. 267,354 N.W.2d 312 (1984). 
236. People v. Walker, 135 Mich. App. 267, 270, 354 N.W.2d 312, 314 (1984) (citations 
omitted). 
237. See Walker, 135 Mich. App. at 274-75, 354 N.W.2d at 316-17. 
238. 929 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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involved.239 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, with 
Judge Ripple writing, but with Judge Posner, who rejected the Indianapolis 
limitations on violent video game play by minors, on the panel, examined a 
Chicago ordinance prohibiting minors from playing video games during 
school hours.24o The plaintiff, operator of a video arcade, had claimed first 
amendment protection for video games in general, and the court rejected the 
broad claim, while leaving open the possibility that some games are 
protected.24I 
We are aware that several district courts, ruling in a variety of factual contexts and 
upon requests for preliminary injunctions, have held that video games are not 
protected by the first amendment. However, these cases do not hold that, under all 
circumstances, all video games can be characterized as completely devoid of any first 
amendment protection. On the basis ofthe complaint alone, we cannot tell whether 
the video games at issue here are simply modem day pinball machines or whether 
they are more sophisticated presentations involving storyline and plot that convey to 
the user a significant artistic message protected by the first amendment [sic]. Nor is 
it clear whether these games may be considered works of art. To hold on this record 
that all video games-no matter what their content-are completely devoid of artistic 
value would require us to make an assumption entirely unsupported by the record and 
perhaps totally at odds with reality.242 
The court did not have to decide whether the specific games involved were 
worthy of first amendment protection because it could uphold the ordinance 
as a time, place, or manner restriction, even iffree expression were implicated, 
but it clearly left open the possibility that some advanced games may be 
protected.243 
239. There is a case involving the game Dungeons & Dragons that could be taken as 
filling some of the latter part of the gap. The case involved a tort suit by the mother ofa child 
who was obsessed with the game and committed suicide. See Watters v. TSR, Inc., 715 F. 
Supp. 819 (W.O. Ky. 1989), ajJ'd, 904 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1990). Without analyzing the video 
game cases, the judge concluded that Dungeons & Dragons, ''whether it is classified as 
literature or merely a game, falls within the class of publication which is generally afforded 
protection under the first amendment." Watters, 715 F. Supp. at 821. The appellate court found 
it unnecessary to reach the first amendment issue and it affirmed on state tort law grounds. See 
Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1990). 
240. See Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 298 (7th Cir. 1991). 
241. See Rothner, 929 F.2d at 302-03. 
242. Id. at 302-03 (footnote omitted). 
243. See id. at 303. 
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B. Modern Games 
Ten years after Rothner, the issue was again addressed, this time by the 
district court in the Indianapolis case.244 The video game industry again 
claimed that advances in video games had brought with them first amendment 
protection.245 The court looked at the evidence offered and concluded that the 
record supported the claim that at least some video games contain protected 
expression.246 At least, the court believed it could not deny a preliminary 
injunction based on the city's claim that all video games lie outside the scope 
ofthe First Amendment. 247 The appellate court noted the position taken by the 
trial court, but did not offer its own analysis on this point,248 The force of the 
district court's position may be limited by the fact that the issue was not 
central to the ruling. The trial judge used the violence as obscenity theory in 
refusing to issue the injunction, so the only effect of the decision on protection 
was to require an examination of the obscenity issue.249 All that being said, 
however, it is the first case of a court coming to the conclusion it did. 
A recent law review note also took up, in an analysis of the difficulties 
faced in violent video game tort suits, the Rothner invitation to argue that 
modern video games deserve protection and presaged the American 
Amusement district court ruling to that effect.250 The note contends that the 
earlier decisions, decided in the "embryonic stages of video game 
development," are no longer applicable to the more sophisticated games of 
today.25I "Designers today rely on full-motion video, detailed animation, and 
stereo surround sound to bring their storyline, plots, and characters to life. 
Today's games are able to simulate real-world environments ... and vivid 
fantasy worlds."252 That would seem true, but it does not necessarily follow 
that courts will view the modem games as different in kind from the 
embryonic games; they may be seen as simply far more complex pinball 
machines. While there is expression in writing the code that controls the 
244. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943 (2000) 
[hereinafter Am. Amusement Mach./], rev 'd, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 
(2001). 
245. See Am. Amusement Mach. I, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 950. 
246. See id. at 952, 954. 
247. See id. at 954. 
248. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir.) 
[hereinafter Am. Amusement Mach. I/], cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001). 
249. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n II, 244 F.3d at 574. 
250. See David C. Kiernan, Shall the Sins of the Son Be Visited upon the Father? Video 
Game Manufacturer Liability for Violent Video Games, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 207 (2000). 
25 J. Id. at 218. 
252. Id. 
HeinOnline -- 2003 L. Rev. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 99 2003
2003] Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video Games 99 
games and the result may have artistic content, there is still the difference 
between seeing and hearing a story presented in any medium and the activity 
present in pinball machines and video games. 
The note offers other arguments for protection, but those arguments do 
not seem to distinguish the ultra-modem from the not-too-much earlier games. 
Video games are said to playa role in developing the future electorate "by the 
'subtle shaping ofthought which characterizes all artistic expression. ,"253 But, 
many experiences, probably all experiences, playa role in shaping thought. 
Having been in an automobile accident affects the way a person thinks about 
traffic safety issues, but it would be odd to characterize accidental collision 
as communication. The fact that communication affects character does not 
mean that everything that affects character is communication. As long as 
courts continue to see video games primarily as an activity rather than an 
attempt by the designer to communicate, the games may not enjoy first 
amendment protection. 
That is the position taken by Judge Limbaugh.254 To find video games 
to be a form of speech or expression requires, he wrote, that "there must exist 
both an intent to convey a particularized message and a great likelihood that 
this message will be understood. . . . [T]here must be some element of 
information or some idea being communicated in order to receive First 
Amendment protection.,,255 While the First Amendment does apply to 
entertainment such as film, that is because, as the Supreme Court said, the line 
between entertaining and informing is too elusive to allow a conclusion that 
entertainment, which does communicate, is not protected as a way of 
informing.256 Where there is no intent to or likelihood of passing information 
or communicating a message, even the principle that entertainment is 
protected does not apply. 
253. /d. at 219 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)). 
254. See Interactive Digital Software, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1132. 
255. Id. at 1132 (citations omitted). Several recent opinions in tort suits address this 
issue and come down in favor of the video game industry. Sanders v. Acclaim Entertainment, 
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002), simply relies on Am. Amusement Mach. II's 
assumption that at least some games are protected with no significant further analysis. Two 
other recent cases come to the same conclusion and provide additional analysis. See, e.g., James 
v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, _ U.S. _,123 S. Ct. 
967 (2003); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167 (D. Conn. 2002). Both were 
tort cases, and both courts took the allegations of liability to be directed at the messages 
conveyed by the games. See James, 300 F.3d at 695; Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 169, 181. The 
messages are part of the entertainment and would be protected, and the cases indicate that any 
limitations must be directed at the play aspects of video games rather than at limiting the story 
lines. See James, 300 F.3d at 698-99; Wilson, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 181. See also infra note 306 
and accompanying text. 
256. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). 
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The court reviewed a number of video games and "found no conveyance 
of ideas, expression, or anything else that could possibly amount to speech. ,,257 
In the court's view, video games are more like sports or board games than like 
film or television.258 Earlier courts determined that bingo was not protected 
by the First Amendment for that same lack of communication,2S9 and the St. 
Louis court saw no reason to reach a different conclusion simply because 
modern technology was used to present a game in video form. 260 Similarly, 
the court noted that baseball may be accompanied by expression, but is itself 
a game and not expression and does not become expression simply because 
it is the virtual baseball of a video game.261 Nor, the court said, does the 
addition of violence add expression; boxing is no more expression than 
baseball. 262 
C. Improved Story Lines Not Enough 
The basis for the earlier suggestion that video games might one day 
become protected was that the storylines would become more complex and 
eventually reach a level of expression deserving of constitutional protection. 
But, it is not as though earlier video games had no story. Pac-Man was a story 
of a rather happy looking and multi-lived entity being pursued by ghosts 
around a maze. Fortunately for Pac-Man, there were power pills that gave 
him the ability to devour his pursuers. Frogger was a story about a frog trying 
to cross a street without being hit by a vehicle or a river by hopping from log 
to log. Neither story constitutes anything resembling great literature, but 
being great literature is not a requirement for first amendment protection. The 
written work of the worst hack novelist is just as protected as that of Nobel 
Prize winners. 
Judge Limbaugh recognized this equality in the eyes of the First 
Amendment: 
This Court has difficulty accepting that some video games do contain expression 
while others do not, and it finds that this is a dangerous path to follow. The First 
Amendment does not allow us to review books, magazines, motion pictures, or music 
and decide that some ofthem are speech and some of them are not. It appears to the 
257. Interactive Digital Software, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
258. See id. 
259. See, e.g., There To Care, Inc. v. Comm'r of the Ind. Dep't of Revenue, 19 F.3d 
1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994); Allendale Leasing, Inc. v. Stone, 614 F. Supp. 1440, 1454 (D.R.1. 
1985), aff'd, 788 F.2d 830 (I st Cir. 1986). 
260. See Interactive Digital Software, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. 
261. See id. 
262. See id. at 1134-35. 
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Court that either a "medium" provides sufficient elements of communication and 
expressiveness to fall within the scope of the First Amendment, or it does not.263 
101 
The judge raises a real concern. To allow first amendment protection to be 
determined by some official's, even a judge's, view as to the complexity ofthe 
story is to open the door to government abuse. 264 It may be far easier to decide 
that a dissident theory is too simplistic to be deserving of protection than it is 
to decide that it presents a clear and present danger. It must be something 
about the medium, or at least the way in which the medium is used, that 
determines protection, not the complexity of the story the medium conveys. 
D. Video Games as Non-communication 
Consider a prosecution of a house of prostitution in which the defendants 
assert a first amendment claim. They point to the use of fantasy rooms and 
claim to have written a variety of complex scripts in the context of which the 
prostitutes engage their customers. The existence of costumes, scenery, and 
scripts do not change the fundamental nature of the transaction, and the First 
Amendment should not serve to protect this otherwise regulable activity. 
As perhaps a better example, consider a paint ball operation in which 
players use firearms that propel a plastic projectile full of paint and engage in 
war games. That would seem to be an activity that would not merit first 
amendment protection. It is a game, not the communication of ideas. As 
such, it is not the sort of human endeavor the First Amendment was designed 
to protect. Now suppose that instead of two teams of players renting the 
weapons and arena, the arena operators supply one of the teams. The paying 
team of customers "fights" the arena team, and the arena operators put great 
effort into designing the layout and scripting the actions and reactions of its 
own team. Even that effort would seem not to extend the umbrella of first 
amendment protection to the actual activity of engaging in paint ball. 
When the state has an interest in regulating an activity that might be 
argued to be expressive, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the interest 
must be in the acts involved rather than in what the acts may communicate.265 
263. !d. at 1134. 
264. The existence of serious, literary, artistic, political, or scientific value does play an 
important role in the obscenity test of Millerv. Caiifornia,413 U.S. 15 (1973). There, however, 
serious value serves to place back under the protection of the first amendment material that 
otherwise meets the test for obscene content. Material is not excluded from the Expression 
Clauses just because it is not sufficiently good or serious but because it appeals to the prurient 
interest, is patently offensive, and depicts acts specifically defined by statute. See Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973). 
265. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
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If the state's interest is in prohibiting commercial sex or in preventing injury 
to paint ball players, that should not raise first amendment problems. It is 
when the state is instead motivated by a desire to suppress the scripts 
themselves that there is a clear free expression violation. 
The case for video games should, in fact, be easier than the examples. 
In the examples, there is another person, prostitute or player, involved and 
what might conceivably count as communication with that person. The 
prostitute's customer, in reacting to the setting and script, communicates some 
message that, in conjunction with alternative available scripts, tells the 
prostitute how the action is to continue. Similarly with the paint ball example; 
the actions of the players trigger one of a number of available reactions or 
scripts from the management team. The player's actions told the game 
provider what the player wanted to do, and the provider responded 
accordingly. With an ordinary arcade video game, there is no one with whom 
the player can communicate. It is only a machine, and while the programmer 
may communicate to the player through the software, the player's actions do 
not communicate back to the programmer but only to the program. A game 
involving two or more players, as in a multi -player arcade game or more likely 
an on-line game, would involve person-to-person communication. The multi-
player video game, however, should be no more protected by the First 
Amendment than the fantasy sex or paint ball examples or a game of baseball, 
checkers, or tennis. The only personal interactions are simply moves of the 
game intended to win, rather than to convey any message. 
Programmers would likely respond that there is great creativity in the 
development of the code involved in making the games operate and that such 
creativity deserves protection. They are clearly right on the first claim, but the 
second claim is not as certain. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit recently considered the first amendment status of computer 
code in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. COr/ey,266 a case arising under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).267 The case grew out of Corley 
posting on his website a decryption code for the encryption that protects DVD 
movies from being copied.268 The DMCA prohibits providing technology 
capable of circumventing digital walls set up by copyright owners, and the 
film industry sought an injunction against Corley.269 As one of his responses, 
Corley claimed that his posting of the code was protected by the First 
266. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
267. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No.1 05-304,112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5,28,35, & 17 U.S.C.). 
268. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 435-436 (2d Cir. 2001). 
269. See Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 435. 
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Amendment, and the court was faced with the question of the status of 
computer code as speech.270 
The court recognized that code can merit protection and that code is in 
some sense like mathematical formulae or musical scores, capable of carrying 
messages to those conversant in the symbolic language, and the obscurity of 
the language should not be of constitutional relevance.271 According to the 
Court, "[i]f someone chose to write a novel entirely in computer object code 
by using strings of 1 's and 0' s for each letter of each word, the resulting work 
would be no different for constitutional purposes than if it had been written 
in English."m Computer code, of course, also causes computers to perform 
functions, but the court would not allow that to deprive code of first 
amendment protection. Such code is also understandable by a human 
programmer and thus can convey information and merits protection, but the 
scope of the protection still required analysis. 
Corley argued that code is similar to blueprints or recipes that 
communicate methods of accomplishing goals or tasks, but the court 
disagreed.273 
Unlike a blueprint or a recipe, which cannot yield any functional result without 
human comprehension of its content, human decision-making, and human action, 
computer code can instantly cause a computer to accomplish tasks .... [The] realities 
of what code is and what its normal functions are require a First Amendment analysis 
that treats code as combining non speech and speech elements, i.e., functional and 
expressive elements .... We recognize ... that the functional capability of computer 
code cannot yield a result until a human being decides to insert the disk containing 
the code into a computer and causes it to perform its function .... Nevertheless, this 
momentary intercession of human action does not diminish the non speech component 
of code, nor render code entirely speech.274 
The DMCA' s proscription against posting a decryption code targeted only the 
nonspeech aspects of the code. It was unconcerned with providing 
information to a human but only with providing a tool that could cause a 
computer to execute a particular task, and that target of functional capacity 
was not aimed at the speech aspects of the computer code.275 
Code written by video game developers should merit more first 
amendment protection than the decryption code. The decryption code may 
have conveyed information to programmers, but its primary, almost exclusive, 
use was to decrypt. The code for video games is more clearly aimed at 
270. See id. at 436. 
271. See id. at 445-46. 
272. Id. at 445-46. 
273. See id. at 451. 
274. Id. 
275. See Universal City StudiOS, 273 F.3d at 454. 
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conveying infonnation or expression to human beings. It also, however, does 
have a functional role. 
In addition to providing a storyline and setting, video game code causes 
the computer to operate for the player to accomplish tasks against that 
background. Ifvideo games simply involved putting in a quarter and watching 
a story unfold on the screen, the game would be protected, and it should make 
no difference that the images are produced through the operation of code 
instead of the projection of light through celluloid. The developer is still 
providing communication to a human recipient, and that is protected, whatever 
the medium. 
The aspects of the code that allow for human participation in the game, 
however, are a different story. That part of the code is not read or viewed by 
the player and conveys no infonnation to him or her. Rather, that part of the 
code is functional. It causes the program to skip to a particular spot to 
continue the action, depending on what the action of the player was. 
Arguably, skipping to a spot in the program could also be protected. If a video 
game did not show the same story each time a quarter was inserted but 
randomly chose different options at various points in the story, that is no less 
the conveyance of expression to a human. But, the player's selection of the 
next part of the story is not communication to anyone. There is, at that time, 
no other human involved, and the player in firing the weapon in a first person 
shooter game is no more speaking, in a first amendment sense, than is a 
computer operator who inserts a disk to run any other program. 
There is an available and seemingly strong response to this conclusion. 
A person conducting research on a computer, accessing a database, would 
seem to be in the same situation as the video game player. The researcher's 
. requests for materials are not conveyed to a human being, so there is no 
communication in that direction, in the same sense that there is no 
communication from the video game player to any human. If there is to be a 
distinction, it must be in the activity in which the two are engaged. The 
researcher's work that is the goal of the request is itself protected by the First 
Amendment. Research, as a step to knowledge, merits the full protection of 
the Amendment. The game player's response to the machine is not research 
but a part of a game, and if it is protected, so are pinball, bingo, and baseball. 
On the other hand, a person faced with a novel with a choice of ending 
also does not communicate to another human. If on page eighty, the reader is 
given the opportunity to go to page eighty-one if he or she wants a tragic 
ending or to page three hundred if a happy ending is desired, the choice and 
the medium in which it is given would seem to be protected in the same way 
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in which the selection of the book in the first place would be protected.276 The 
situation would seem to be the same where the selection of continuing 
storyline is made in an electronically based medium. In response, just because 
a choice must be allowed does not mean that all ways in which to make the 
choice are protected. A novelist may be free to send a variable book chapter 
by chapter, with the reader communicating what sort of next chapter is 
desired, but that does not make all ways of conveying the choice protected. 
Clearly, the state is not barred from forbidding non speech acts, just because 
a novelist might respond to the acts by sending a chapter in an unfolding story. 
The firing of a weapon in a first person shooter game is an act that has a 
function rather than one that serves to communicate. As long as the state's 
interest is in limiting the act rather than controlling the story, the limit should 
not violate the First Amendment. 
As long as the state does not ban children from watching the story 
presented by the video game, its focus would seem to be on an act that is not 
a part of any human to human communication. Any second amendment 
problems aside, a ban on children shooting on a target range would not raise 
first amendment problems. That should be true even if the operator gave away 
books for prize winning performances. The same should hold for a video 
shooting game, where the prize is the continuation of the story in a particular 
direction. As long as it is the shooting activity that gives rise to the concern 
and is the sole limitation, rather than the content of the story, the First 
Amendment should not bar the regulation of access by children to first person 
shooter games. 
That conclusion may be argued so far to apply only to the current 
generation of video games. As internet versions or two player arcade games 
develop, there will be two or more people involved in the game. One player's 
action will not be communicated solely to a computer code bringing about a 
shift in storyline. It will cause an effect on another player's screen, and that 
might be argued to be communication to the other player. But, if that serves 
to provide first amendment protection, all games, with the exception of 
solitaire, would seem equally protected. When a batter in baseball hits a ball, 
it causes actions by the other team's fielders. When a chess player moves a 
piece, it causes his or her opponent to make a counter move. But neither the 
hit ball nor the moved chess piece is communication; they are both just acts 
that are part of the game. So too for the video game player's action, even in 
a next generation game. 
276. The same point could be made for improvisational comedy, in which the audience 
suggests the next part of the vignette, or for any other sort of interactive theater. 
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IV. IMPLEMENTING THEORY 
A. First Amendment Values 
Judge Posner, in his American Amusement Machine Ass 'n v. Kendrick!-77 
opinion, argued that Indianapolis could not limit children's access to violent 
video games, even in support of parents' wishes that they not play. He said 
that children have first amendment rights and that those rights are independent 
of any rights of their parents.278 He saw the enforcement of the limitation, 
even in support of parental control over influences on their children, as the 
imposition of an orthodoxy government could not be allowed to further. 279 In 
very colorful language, the court raised the specter of such regimented 
thinking leading to "[t]he murderous fanaticism displayed by young German 
soldiers in World War II, alumni of the Hitler Jugend."280 
Interestingly, Judge Posner was not far from the mark in his concern over 
Nazism, but he was coming from the wrong direction. Resistance Records, 
the label that produces musical groups such as RaHoWa (Racial Holy War), 
Nordic Thunder, and Angry Aryans and such titles as "Racially Motivated 
Violence" and "Race Riot," now offers a video game titled "Ethnic 
Cleansing."281 The player, after choosing to play the role of either a skinhead 
or member of the KKK, moves through the streets of a virtual city killing 
gangs of "predatory sub-humans," Black and Hispanic characters, eventually 
entering the subways to attack the "sub-human" Jewish masters, end their 
plans for world domination, and save the White race, and this is not the only 
game of its ilk.282 The violence of much of the video game genre has been 
melded with bigotry to create a far more real danger of Nazism than Judge 
Posner's specter. 
Despite the perhaps overblown rhetoric, Judge Posner does raise a 
serious issue regarding the age at which violent video game limitations should 
be addressed. As he put it, "[n]ow that eighteen-year-olds have the right to 
vote, it is obvious that they must be allowed the freedom to form their political 
views on the basis of uncensored speech before they tum eighteen, so that 
277. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001). 
278. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir.) 
[hereinafter Am. Amusement Mach. II], cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001). 
279. See Am. Amusement Mach. 11,244 F.3d at 578. 
280. Id. at 577. 
281. For a catalog of their offerings see http://www.resistance.com. 
282. See http://www.resistance.comlethniccleansing; Anti-Defamation League, Racist 
Groups Using Computer Gaming to Promote Violence Against Blacks, Latinos and Jews, at 
http://www.adl.orglvideogamesldefault.asp (last visited Mar. 12,2003). 
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their minds are not a blank when they first exercise the franchise. "283 While 
it may be questionable how many violent video games one must play to be a 
competent voter, lines are better drawn on the basis of age than on content. 
Furthermore, the difference in an eighteen-year-old limitation and one set at 
an earlier age has been at least relevant in the Supreme Court's consideration 
of efforts to protect children. In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,284 
the Court noted that the internet restrictions at issue there were broader than 
what had been acceptable in Ginsbergv. New Yorfil 8S in part because Ginsberg 
prohibited sales to those under seventeen, while the internet regulations used 
eighteen as the relevant age.286 To avoid this concern, it would be advisable 
to impose any restrictions only on those under the age of seventeen. 
Judge Posner also refused to accept, as a justification for Indianapolis' 
regulations, the support of parental desires to limit their children's access to 
violent video games.287 He said that the eighteen-year-old's right to vote is his 
or her own right independent of parental rights.288 The right of the seventeen-
year-old to form political opinions was, therefore, also independent of the 
parents' wishes, at least to the extent of limiting the state from being enlisted 
in the enforcement ofthose wishes.289 This conclusion may be questionable, 
given Ginsberg's willingness to allow the state to support parental limitations, 
but again Ginsberg was addressed to sales to those under seventeen, when the 
right need not be so independent. Ginsberg in conjunction with Reno, 
however, does suggest another limitation on statutes regulating access to 
violent video games. The Reno Court also distinguished the internet 
regulations there with the statute in Ginsberg by the fact that Ginsberg'S 
statute did not restrict parental provision of the materials addressed, while the 
internet regulations limited everyone, parents included.290 In light of that 
distinction, it would be wise to include a provision under which parents may 
provide permission for their children to play in arcades, and parents should be 
allowed to buy violent video games for their children. 
This combination of a "below the age of seventeen" age limit and 
allowing parents to make the choices that ought to be theirs for those younger 
than seventeen protects first amendment values while also protecting children. 
Below the age of seventeen, it recognizes the legitimate role parents play in 
283. Am. Amusement Mach. II, 244 F.3d at 577. 
284. 521 U.S. 844 (\997). 
285. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
286. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,865 (1997). 
287. See Am. Amusement Mach. 11,244 F.3d at 578. 
288. See id. at 577. 
289. See id. 
290. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 855. 
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decisions as to the influences their children face.291 Ginsberg recognized that 
the state can help parents impose those decisions on their children. While the 
material at issue in Ginsberg was not protected by the First Amendment, when 
distributed to children, the extension of that result to violent video games 
under any of the theories offered has been the focus of this effort, and 
Ginsberg's willingness to help parents should carry over to this context and 
should also not be seen as damaging to the values behind the First 
Amendment. The legitimate issue of eighteen-year-old voting, whatever the 
relationship of playing violent video games to the exercise of that right, is 
protected by allowing the new voter a year in which the state does not impose 
even the parent's view as to what is suitable. 
B. Drafting Statutes 
The specific language of a statute limiting children's access to violent 
video games depends strongly on the theory the drafters believe is most likely 
to justify the limitations. While the suggestions as to age and parental 
permission are general, the rest of the drafting must be more tailored to theory. 
Ajurisdiction within the seventh circuit would probably be ill advised to rely 
on the obscenity thesis. A better approach would be to base the statute on the 
harm that violent video games are seen as causing and making an effort to lay 
out a convincing case for that harm. While the seventh circuit was not 
impressed with the evidence offered, a better case might be made. Such a 
jurisdiction could instead draft a statute relying on the unprotected status of 
video games. The courts in the Indianapolis case assumed, but did not really 
decide, that video games were protected expression, and that issue could still 
be contested.292 Ajurisdiction outside the seventh circuit might try either of 
291. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
292. See Am. Amusement Mach. II, 244 F.3d at 572. 
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the above approaches or still use the obscenity theory.293 Whatever theory is 
to justify the legislation, care must be given to what the theory says about the 
focus of the statute. Before turning to that issue, it should be noted that there 
is no need to rely on a single theory. A jurisdiction might instead choose to 
employ a combination of approaches by adopting separately two or three of 
the suggested statutes. 
1. Statutes Based on Harm 
If it is accepted that violent video games are protected by the First 
Amendment, and a statute is to be justified on the basis of the harm that 
violent video games do to the physical and psychological well-being of youth, 
the statute will have to be narrowly tailored to that harm. Given the reluctance 
of courts to accept the conclusions of social scientists regarding the aggression 
inducing effects of watching violent television or film, it would be wise to 
narrow limitations based on this theory to first person shooter games. While 
a court might accept the recent conclusions of the health care professionals 
and conclude that the general evidence is better established than it had been, 
the approach more likely to be successful would be to focus on the 
interactivity of shooting video games. 
293. Other jurisdictions have considered the nature of violent depictions and the 
obscenity exception, and reliance on the theory might be less wise in those regions, although 
the analysis lacked the detail ofthe Seventh Circuit opinion and the option may be less closed. 
The Second Circuit, in Eclipse Enterprises, Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1997), struck 
down a local ordinance barring the sale to minors of trading cards depicting heinous crime, 
harmful to minors, defined as in the Indianapolis and St. Louis ordinances. In doing so, the 
court said that the standards that apply to violence and obscenity differ because obscenity is not 
protected speech, but did not examine whether the two should be distinct categories. See 
Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1997). A concurring opinion in 
Gulotta accepts the conclusion with no additional analysis, but does consider the analogy to 
obscenity reasonable. See Eclipse Enters., 134 F.3d at 69-70 (Griesa, J., concurring). 
The Sixth Circuit, in James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002), 
cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 123 S. Ct. 967 (2003), also refused to include violence within its 
obscenity jurisprudence. It did so in the context of a tort suit and noted that the arguments of 
the plaintiffs did not address the concerns common to obscenity proscriptions, offense rather 
than danger. See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 695-99 (6th Cir. 2002). The 
conclusion may not apply as directly to a legislative determination that violent materials are 
unsuitable for children, but the decision would counsel caution using the approach in the Sixth 
Circuit as well. 
There are also somewhat older cases, see, for example, Video Software Dealers 
Ass 'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992) and Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 
866 S. W.2d 520 (Tenn. 1993), that have stated that there is a difference between violence and 
obscenity, but without any analysis of the arguments offered supra notes 133-210 and 
accompanying text. 
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The strength of Grossman's conclusions is in the analogy to the methods 
used by the armed forces to increase firing rate and the provision of the skills 
necessary to be an effective killer. Any statute based on those conclusions 
would be limited to first person shooter games in which the targets are virtual 
humans or entities with human-like characteristics. A statute will have to be 
drafted carefully to define how human the targets must be. A simple shooting 
gallery game should not be included, so as to avoid a statute that lacks narrow 
tailoring. Rather, there must be some significant degree of 
anthropomorphization of any animals or aliens that serve as targets. 
An important limitation to this justification is that it should not be 
employed to support statutes that limit watching others play the games. 
Watching others is more akin to watching television or film, and if courts are 
unwilling to approve bans in those media on the basis ofthe harm caused, they 
are unlikely to allow a ban on what is still the essentially passive activity of 
watching others play. If there is in fact a difference in the interactive video 
game, it is a difference that speaks to the player. It is the player who develops 
the deadly skills, and it is the player who rehearses the behavior in the virtual 
context and becomes more psychologically capable of engaging in similar 
behavior in the real world. Thus, unless a court is willing to split from earlier 
decisions and conclude that there is sufficient harm from aggression inducing 
effects in the passive viewing of violent video game play, the harm 
justification should be employed only for statutes addressing play by minors. 
2. Statutes Based on Violence as Obscene 
Statutes based on the conclusion that violent depictions can be obscene, 
at least when children are the viewers, can address not only players but also 
minors who watch others play. Since the justification relies on an extension 
of Ginsberg and the test for obscenity found in Miller v. Calijornia,294 a 
statute should be guided by those cases. Some changes in the Miller test, 
which asks: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would 
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value[,f95 
294. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
295. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,24 (1973) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 489 (1957» (citations omitted). 
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are required, since Miller addressed sex and the current concern is violence. 
Other changes in the wording of the Miller test are necessitated by the fact 
that the statute is addressed to obscenity as to children, just as Ginsberg 
required adaptation in the language of the then existing test for sexual 
obscenity. 
The first change is in the first prong, since "prurient" speaks to sex. The 
Court had earlier, in Roth v. United States,296 defined the word as meaning 
"material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts,,297 and cited a 
dictionary definition as "[i]tching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing; of 
persons having itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or 
propensity, lewd."298 The equivalent of a prurient interest in sex has been 
taken to be a "morbid interest in violence,"299 since both seem to indicate 
something that goes beyond simple curiosity or casual interest. The 
community standards aspect of the first prong also has to be refocused on 
minors, or as suggested those under seventeen, so the first prong should 
require that the average person, applying contemporary community standards 
finds that the game, as a whole, appeals to a morbid or perhaps depraved 
interest in violence for those under seventeen. 
The second prong requires specificity in the on-screen images addressed 
and again needs a focus on minors. A statute would have to require a finding 
that the game depicts acts in a way that is patently offensive under 
contemporary community standards as to what is suitable for those under 
seventeen. The statute must also specifically define the conduct or acts 
addressed. The Indianapolis ordinance listed "realistic serious injury to a 
human or human-like being where such serious injury includes amputation, 
decapitation, dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation, maImmg or 
disfiguration"30o and the St. Louis ordinance employed the same language.301 
Both these lists would seem to exclude the killing of a human, if 
unaccompanied by bloodshed, amputation, etc. The bill in the House of 
Representatives did include killing by use of a lethal weapon or in hand to 
hand combat and aggravated assault or battery, which seem like reasonable 
296. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
297. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,487 n.20 (1957). 
298. Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20 (citations omitted). 
299. This was the language in the Indianapolis ordinance, see American Amusement 
Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd, 244 F.3d 572 
(7th CiT.) [hereinafter Am. Amusement Mach.i], cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001) (citations 
omitted), as well as in the St. Louis ordinance, see Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. 
Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1130 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (citations omitted). 
300. Am. Amusement Mach. I, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 946 (citations omitted). 
30 I. See Interactive Digital Software, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1130. 
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additions, but went on to include prostitution and illegal drug use.302 These 
latter two additions would seem difficult to justify under the theories 
presented here and might better be omitted and the focus left on violent 
cnmes. 
The language in the two ordinances designed to meet the second prong 
of Miller may also be argued to be unconstitutionally vague. But, both district 
courts considered and rejected that claim, finding the definitions provided 
were no more vague than those validated for sexual obscenity under Miller.303 
The St. Louis ordinance also incorporated the video game indUStry's own 
rating system as rebuttable presumptions. Games rated as unsuitable for those 
under seventeen would be presumed harmful to minors for purposes of 
applying the ordinance, while those rated for a younger audience would be 
presumed not harmful to minors.304 The industry objected to what it saw as 
a delegation of legislative power to its own rating boards, but the court 
rejected the challenge, noting that the ordinance did itself provide a definition 
and only adopted the industry ratings as rebuttable presumptions. 305 The tactic 
of reference to the industry rating system is a useful one in meeting scienter 
requirements. If the arcade operator or retailer must be shown to have known 
the nature of the video games involved, allowing a defense of good faith 
reliance on the standards will exonerate the merchant who did not realize the 
nature of the material. Employed in the other direction, the mature or adult 
only rating is probably less justifiable as a presumption that the material 
violates the ordinance or statute than as a presumption of scienter, and a jury 
should be required to itself find that the game does meet the statutory 
definition. 
Lastly, the savings clause of the Miller test must be retained, although 
it should again be refocused on minors. Even if a video game does appeal to 
a morbid interest on the part of children in violence and goes beyond 
community standards of offensiveness as to what is suitable for children, a 
game should still be protected if it has serious value for children. If a game, 
taken as a whole, has serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for 
those under seventeen, it should not be considered obscene as to minors and 
its play could not be proscribed under this theory. 
302. See H.R. 4645, 107th Congo (2d Sess. 2002). 
303. See Interactive Digital Software, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1139-40; Am. Amusement 
Mach. I, 115 F. Supp. 2d at 978-80. 
304. See Interactive Digital Software, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1130-31. 
305. See id. at 1139. 
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3. Statutes Based on Video Games as Unprotected 
Justifying a statute based on the theory that video games are unprotected, 
assuming a court accepts the theory, would seem the easiest path; that is, if the 
First Amendment does not protect video games, it should have little to say 
about the proper dimensions of a statute. Drafting, however, would not be as 
simple as it might at first appear. It must be remembered that the theory 
recognizes a distinction between the storyline, which is more akin to the 
entertainment of film, television, or the novel and enjoys first amendment 
protection, and the play of the game.306 
Like a statute motivated by or justified under the first theory, the harmful 
effects of player interactivity, a limitation under this last theory would be 
justified only with regard to play and not to viewing either a story or the play 
of others. Furthermore, such a statute must focus on the actions involved 
rather than on the story context. An ordinance that prohibits children from 
playing video games involving virtual weapons or shooting would, under the 
analysis provided herein, not raise first amendment concerns. An ordinance 
that addressed shooting in the context of human targets would present a focus 
on the story and could raise such concerns. If it is the story line that is the 
focus of the statute, one of the first two theories must be employed; if it is 
purely the actions involved in playing the game, the third theory can serve to 
justify such restrictions. 
CONCLUSION 
While attempts to limit the access of minors to materials containing 
depictions of violence have not met with great past success, first person 
shooter violent video games may be sufficiently different to allow restriction. 
The outcome is by no means assured, but a court may find that such games are 
a greater danger to the physical and psychological well being of youth so that 
a statute narrowly tailored to the first person shooter games with human or 
human like targets can survive strict scrutiny. Alternatively, a court may, like 
the district court in the Indianapolis case, determine that our society's focus 
of obscenity law over somewhat more than the last century is misguided and 
that the exception should include the modern violent images that many find 
far more offensive than sexual images. Lastly, the true nature of video games, 
as games rather than as a form of communication, may lead a court, like the 
district court in the St. Louis case, to deny first amendment protection to the 
306. See supra note 263-76 and accompanying text. 
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actual play of the games while protecting design and story and allow 
restrictions on video shooting activities by youth. 
